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I. INTRODUCTION

Scholarly literature on terrorism, national security, and emergencies
has flourished since September 11. The terrorist attacks and the measures
taken thereafter by the Bush administration and Congress have proved
fertile ground for scholars on both sides of the political spectrum to argue
where the country should go, what congress should enact, and how the
courts should respond to seemingly new issues such as coercive
interrogations, surveillance, preventive detentions, and suspension of
habeas corpus rights for enemy combatants.
This debate is mostly carried out in normative terms.2 Authors seek to
justify or oppose specific measures. They write on varied subjects, from
how to structure the intelligence community3 to whether detainees in
Guantanamo Bay are entitled to habeas review.' One camp will usually
argue that the courts should refrain from adjudicating matters of national
security, while the other will claim that our emergencies provide the best
test for our cherished values of liberty and freedom.'

1. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should CoerciveInterrogationBe Legal?
104 MICH. L. REV. 671 (2006); John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the
Constitution, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 565 (2007); Jules Lobel, Rounding Up Unusual Suspects:
Human Rights in the Wake of 9/11: Preventive Detention: Prisoners,Suspected Terroristsand
PermanentEmergency, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 389 (2003); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 2029, 2071 (2007).
2. There are, of course, exceptions. Mark Tushnet has written on the structural aspects of
emergencies. Mark Tushnet, The PoliticalConstitutionof Emergency Powers:Parliamentaryand
Separation-of-PowersRegulation, I INT'L J.L. IN CONTEXT 275 (2008).
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN THE
THROES OF REFORM (2006).

4. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1.
5. Cf ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2006) (arguing for a limited role for the courts and greater reliance on
the executive); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003) (arguing that the United States has not learned the lessons

from past emergencies and that terrorists succeed when overreaction to terrorist threat results in the
undermining of democratic principles).
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All of this is understandable. However, it seems that the literature is not
paying enough attention to the structural aspect which ought to concern us
as well. By structural aspect I mean the role our institutions play in times
of crisis. It is partly through institutional design, in this case the separation
of powers scheme, that we can understand why the courts, Congress and
the executive are acting the way they do. It is the interplay between these
institutions that has the explanatory force that normative theory does not
take into consideration.
The overarching argument of this Article is simple: the way we design
our governmental institutions affects the kinds of decisions these
institutions produce. Specifically, a certain form of separation of powers
scheme may produce one type of judicial reasoning, whereas a different
form will produce another. This feature is salient in "crisis cases"; cases
which result from an increased demand for security at the expense of civil
liberties. Thus, the Court's position on many of the crisis cases is not
simply explained away by the liberal and conservative divide. Rather,
separation of powers schemes can constrain judges, or at the very least
make them reason differently.
In the U.S. context, it appears that the Court has been fairly consistent
in endorsing an institutional process based approach when deciding crisis
cases. Although lacking an agreed upon definition of an emergency or
crisis,6 Mark Tushnet provides a helpful definition:
An "emergency" occurs when there is general agreement that a
nation or some part of it faces a sudden and unexpected rise in
social costs, accompanied by a great deal of uncertainty about the
length of time the high level of cost will persist.. . "Emergency
powers" describes the expansion of governmental authority
generally and the concomitant alteration in the scope of individual
liberty, and the transfer of important "first instance" law-making
authority from legislatures to executive officials, in emergencies.7

6. Defining an emergency or crisis is notoriously difficult, perhaps impossible. See
generally OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA Ni AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2006). In this Article, I would much rather appeal to our sensible
conventionalist way of thinking. As articulated in the following footnote, emergency and crisis
cases are cases involving an increased demand for security concerns. They suggest that the
"normal" way of life, or what life should normally be like, has been altered by some event, most
commonly a war, a terrorist attack, or a natural disaster.
7. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 275.
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This means that in crisis cases the courts will most likely be limited to
examining whether there was congressional authorization for the executive
policy being challenged. On this view, each branch is specifically
competent in performing particular tasks, while the other branches serve
as a check on the use of that branch's power.8 In resolving crisis cases, the
locus of judicial activity will not be the delineation of substantive
individual rights, but statutory interpretation in order to conclude whether
an authorization has in fact been granted.
For reasons discussed below, 9 this approach can be problematic, both
from an internal and an external perspective. Internally, striving to
maintain the separation of powers scheme can sometimes, depending on
the political constellation, lead to problems of under-enforcement of the
same structure the Court is seeking to maintain. Externally, adopting a
process based approach can raise normative questions having to do with
preserving individual rights.
Since the main argument this Article seeks to advance is that the formal
structure of government impacts the way courts argue, it would be helpful
to compare the American system of government to other systems in this
regard. For the purposes of my argument I have chosen the Israeli context.
Israel operates under a parliamentary system and has also faced significant
security issues over the years. Although dealing with security concerns as
well, the Israeli Supreme Court employs different judicial reasoning to
adjudicate crisis cases. Initially, the Israeli Supreme Court was inclined to
adopt an American style separation of powers approach, but changes in
Israeli politics and constitutional law led to the rejection of this line of
argumentation, eventually adopting a rights based, rather than process
based, approach.
Because the formal structure of separation of powers may result in
different judicial approaches in crisis cases, questions of institutional
design are important. Institutions constitute the general frameworks in
which we operate, thus structuring our everyday choices. While this
insight may seem trivial, it is one we often forget at the cost of
disconnecting ourselves from our institutions, failing to take account of
their pervasive influence over our private and public spheres.
This Article will proceed as follows. The first part will briefly discuss
emergencies and the types of questions they raise for government. The
second part will largely be a historical survey of U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence dealing with emergencies from the Civil War to the present
day. This survey will show that when it comes to emergencies, the Court
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 305 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 166-88.
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largely perceives itself not as the guardian of individual rights, but as an
enforcer of the political process and separation of powers scheme. The
third part will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of such an
approach and present a possible wrinkle. The fourth part is comparative.
In order to demonstrate that different separation of powers schemes
produce different judicial reasoning methods, I will discuss emergency
jurisprudence from Israel, which has a parliamentary system. The fifth part
will conclude by offering some preliminary thoughts on the role of
institutions and the importance of institutional design.
II. THE DIFFERENT QUESTIONS EMERGENCIES POSE
The past six years have witnessed growing security concerns in the
United States and Western European countries as a result of terrorist
attacks in New York, Washington D.C., London, and Madrid. Wars,
emergencies, and periods of crisis are a part of life in an organized
political society. They raise questions having to do with politics, social
policy, and economic policy.' ° Most of the issues implicate questions of
law as well. How should a country conduct itself in an emergency? If it is
a security threat, should it go to war? Should it enact special laws
governing domestic issues? Should it nationalize or seize important
industries connected to the war effort?" Should 12it isolate the population of
the same ethnic group as the one it is fighting?
All of these are particular questions that have to do with particular
emergencies that have beset modern democracies. But the occurrence of
emergencies also raises conceptual and theoretical problems on the
constitutional level. How should a constitution address emergencies?
Should it ignore them and assume that "life goes on" while applying the
same rules? Should it provide special constitutional arrangements dealing
specifically with these issues? Or, perhaps, the application of any legal
rule to an emergency is misconceived, and the government should be
allowed to act outside the legal order with impunity.
Questions of the latter type have to do with purposeful institutional
design. They are mostly confronted by countries seeking to enact a
constitution, countries that are going through some kind of transformative

10. Mark E. Brandon, War and the American ConstitutionalOrder,in THE CONSTITuTION
IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 31-35 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).

11. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
12. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); ExparteEndo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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change or a period of transition. Such was the case, for example, in South
Africa, when it adopted its new post-apartheid constitution which
addressed such concerns, 3 or in Germany during the Weimar Republic,
when it enacted Section 48 providing for emergency presidential decrees.' 4
Of course, there is the general more theoretical issue of whether a
constitution should even have an emergency provision. 5
Questions of the former type, those addressing specific proposals such
as seizure of crucial industries, military conscription, or increased security
at airports, are generally argued first from the level of policy. Legalistic
considerations serve as second order considerations. We ask what would
be an effective measure to address the current crisis. We then see if it
comports with our constitutional and legal framework and proceed
accordingly.' 6 This process usually takes place outside and before courts
have their say (although of course policymakers consider what courts have
said in the past), 7 and is carried out in terms of desirability.
These two questions are important, but this Article proceeds in neither
of these directions. Instead, I believe it helpful to dispense with the
theoretical models provided by different writers. These can be useful if and
when we decide to adopt a new approach for the way the courts deal with
emergencies and crises. At the same time, for the purposes of this Article,
I shall not focus my attention on one specific issue raised by emergencies,
such as detentions, military trials, or seizures of vital industries. These

13. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2 § 37.
14. See generally WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard

Schlink eds., 2000).
15. These issues are discussed at length in Adam Shinar, Constitutions in Crisis and Judicial
Methodology (May 2007) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Harvard University). For different opinions
on these issues, see JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 160 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988);
Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency
Powersand the "Norm-Exception "Dichotomy, 21 CARDOzOL. REV. 1825 (2000); CARL SCHMITT,
POLITICALTHEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ONTHE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans.,
1985); BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE
OF TERRORISM (2006); Oren Gross, Chaosand Rules: Should Responses to Violent CrisesAlways
Be Constitutional?,112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Mark Tushnet, DefendingKorematsu?:Reflections
on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 273 (The positions range from arguing that

emergency provisions are meaningless because legality itself disappears in an emergency (Schmitt),
to a position arguing that emergency statutes are a good way to control executive unilateralism
(Ackerman)).

16. It is possible for the legalistic and policy considerations to occur simultaneously, but this
is not important for present purposes.
17. David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in

Times of Crisis,101 MICH. L. REV. 2565,2566 (2003) (arguing that past decisions contribute to the
framing of present policy debates).
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issues, however, serve as a background to examine the structural features
of the governmental system. Understanding that structure and its inherent
limitations should come before examining any proposal for reform, let us
now turn to that.
Il. CRISIS ADJUDICATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Introduction
This part surveys the use of emergency powers throughout American
history. It is by no means a definitive historical analysis. It seeks to
illuminate the way these powers have been exercised and the way the
branches of government have operated in regards to these powers. The
cases that will be discussed are familiar and have been analyzed
extensively elsewhere. Therefore, they will not be reviewed at length, but
only as a means to illustrate the argument that the courts have adopted a
process based approach to adjudication of crisis cases.
But before this is done, it will be helpful to outline the basic
constitutional framework underlying the use of war powers. Under Article
I, the Constitution vests the following powers in the Congress: declaring
war and granting letters of marque and reprisal,"8 raising and supporting
armies and a navy, 9 calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the
union, and suppress insurrections and repel invasions.2" Article II vests the
power of commander-in-chief of the army and navy and militia with the
President" and determines that he shall take care that the laws are
faithfully executed.22 The relationship between these provisions and the
internal interpretation of each clause, specifically what is contained in the
"commander in-chief-clause," is controversial, and is beyond the scope of
this Article.23 Last, the Suspension Clause permits the suspension of
habeas corpus rights in times of rebellion or invasion when the public
safety may require it.24 As we can see, there are very few constitutional

18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
19. Id. cl. 12-13.
20. Id. cl. 15.
21. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
22. Id. § 3, cl. 4.
23. JideNzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and ConstitutionalDesign, 115 YALE. L.J. 2512,
2514 (2006); Jules Lobel, Conflicts between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent
Power Over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391 (2008).
24. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2
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provisions dealing with security and crisis.
For present purposes it suffices to say that the Constitution sets a
limited government with enumerated powers. However, because these
powers are open to interpretation there are political struggles between the
President and Congress regarding each other's authority. 25 Although no
one questioned the President's power to repel attacks, the Framers were
cautious about giving too much power to the President, thinking it will be
misused for political gains. 26 So, for example, the Constitution separates
the President's commander-in-chief powers from the congressional
acquiescence required to finance military campaigns. 27 Although the
President manages the war, he still needs Congress to declare it and
finance it.
But historical developments and practices distorted the line the framers
sought to draw. 28 As commentators have noted, the executive has accreted
power over the years and has become much stronger than the framers
envisioned.29 Instead of providing a meaningful check on executive power,
Congress has often rallied behind the President during crises or approved
of his actions after the fact. 30 For example, even though the framers
departed from the British model by giving the power to declare war to
Congress, many armed conflicts and wars began without congressional
declaration, while others were ratified after the fact.3'

25.

CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE

MODERN DEMOCRACIES 220 (2d ed. 1961).
26. Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 10 (2d ed. 2004); THE FEDERALIST No. 4
(John Jay); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 66 & 414

(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
28. Michael Ratner & David Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War
PowersResolution, 17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 718 (1984).
29. Arthur S. Miller, Introduction to HENRY BARTHOLOMEW Cox, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: 1829-190 1, at xviii (1984); Jules Lobel, Emergency Powerand the
Decline ofLiberalism, 98 YALE L.J 1385, 1385-86 (1988).
30. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President(Almost) Always Wins in ForeignAffairs: Lessons
of the Iran-ContraAffair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1291 (1988).
3 1. Roger Pilon, The War Powers in Brief: on the Irreducible Politics of the Matter, 2
CARDOzO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 49, 50 (2003).
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B. The Jurisprudence
1. The Civil War
When the war broke Congress was not in session.32 Attempting to
convene it would take time the Union did not have. 33 Lincoln found
himself alone with no precedent to guide him.34 His first act was to issue
an executive order calling forth the militia to combat the secession of the
states. 35 He also called on Congress to convene to consider further
appropriate steps.3 6 Meanwhile, he imposed a naval blockade on the
seceding states, increased the size of the army and navy, and transferred
funds without congressional appropriation. 37 These steps were perhaps
unavoidable, but few thought they were constitutional.38 Despite general
opinion holding that only Congress could suspend habeas corpus under the
Suspension Clause, Lincoln authorized the commanding general of the
U.S. army, Winfield Scott, to suspend the writ in areas he deemed
necessary. 39 This led to Exparte Merryman.4 °
In Merryman, Lincoln ordered the arrest of John Merryman, a
Maryland state legislator who belonged to a pro-Confederate militia.41

32. Paul Finkelman, Limiting Rights in Times of Crisis: OurCivil WarExperience-A History
Lesson for Post 9/11 America, 2 CARDOZO PuB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 25, 34 (2003).
33. Id.
34. ROSSITER, supra note 25, at 224. Cf Cox, supranote 29, at 215 (noting that on February
28th of that year a House committee published a report that if states were to secede, the President
can act only after being enabled to do so by Congress. Congress at the time thought the President
lacked the power to initiate or respond to hostilities if lacking congressional authorization).
35. ROSSITER, supra note 25, at 224
36. Id. at 225.
37. Id. at 226-27.
38. Id. at 226. A year after the blockade was imposed it was sanctioned by the Supreme
Court. It was ruled in the Prize Cases that this was part of his commander-in-chief duties and that
he had a duty to defend the nation against an attack. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1832). Also, this was
not the first time a President transferred funds without congressional appropriation. President
Jefferson provided funds to defend American positions when a British frigate attacked U.S. forces
in 1806. Lobel, supra note 29, at 1392-93. Congress was not in session at the time, and later ratified
the transfer, although recognizing it was illegal. Id.at 1393. Jefferson did not legitimize his act, but
argued that the emergency warranted his disregard for the Constitution. Id.
39. ROSS1TER, supra note 25, at 227. However, this was not exactly a settled issue. As
Finkelman notes, General Andrew Jackson also suspended the writ during the war of 1812.
Finkelman, supra note 32, at 37-38. Although he was fined, Congress later remitted the fine, thus
perhaps acknowledging that it was not the sole body that could invoke the suspension clause. Id.
at 38.
40. ExparteMerryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md 1861) (No. 9,487).
41. Id. at 147.
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Merryman petitioned Chief Justice Taney for a writ of habeas corpus,
claiming that the President had no authority to suspend the writ.42 Taney
ordered the government to appear with Merryman, but to no avail.43 Taney
then wrote an opinion holding that the President had exceeded his
authority and could not suspend the writ, because Article I of the
Constitution granted that authority to Congress alone." Taney ordered the
decision be sent to Lincoln with the hope that he will "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed," to "determine what measures he will take to
cause the civil process of the United States to be respected and
enforced. ' The decision, however, was ignored.46
When Congress convened, Lincoln justified his decisions on military
necessity, arguing that the suspension clause was not specific about the
authority that could suspend the writ, and that he shared that power with
Congress. 7 Congress then ratified the actions. During the war the courts
generally remained out of the picture, but two decisions merit discussion,
involving habeas corpus and trial by military commissions, issues that will
reappear later.
In Exparte Vallandigham,48 Clement Vallandigham violated an order
prohibiting declarations of sympathy for the Confederates.4 ' The Order
further established military commissions to try these violations."

42. Id.
43. Finkelman, supra note 32, at 36-37.
44. Id. at 37.
45. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153.
46. Miller, supra note 29, at 217. Finkelman, supra note 32, at 39. Interestingly enough,
although Merryman is remembered as the first case regarding habeas corpus in the civil war and
the refusal of the executive to honor that writ, a similar decision was handed down by Judge Giles
three weeks prior to the Merryman decision. See Exparte John G. Mullen discussed in JAMES F.
SCHNEIDER, THE COURT IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA, 50 MD. L. REv. 54 (1991). In that case, Giles
ordered the release of a youth who was conscripted into the army in spite of his young age. Id.
Lincoln refused to comply with the writ. Id.
47. Frank I. Michelman, Living with JudicialSupremacy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 579, 594
(2003). For a discussion regarding which branch is vested with the authority to suspend the writ,
see David. L. Shapiro, HabeasCorpus, Suspension, andDetention:Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 59, 70-72 (2006) (concluding that unless there are times of dire emergency when Congress
cannot be convened, all the evidence supports the conclusion that this power is solely vested in
Congress). For an opinion that Lincoln doubted his authority to suspend the writ, see FISHER, supra
note 26, at 47.
48. Exparte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874 (1863).
49. Id. at 919.
50. Id. The circumstances leading to the trial of Vallandigham are described in GEOFFREY
R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH INWARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE

WAR ON TERRORISM 94-120 (2004). I rely on his account. General Burnside, appointed by Lincoln
as the commander of the Ohio Department, promulgated General Order No. 38 declaring that
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Vallandigham was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for the
duration of the war.5' His petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that
he was denied his constitutional rights at trial, was denied, even though the
writ was not suspended in that area at the time.5 2 As Geoffrey Stone
argues, the court understood its role not as "an independent effort to
interpret the first amendment," but as part of a "collaborative effort to
support the [P]resident."53 On this view, "[t]he role of the judiciary... is
to serve as a junior partner, rather than as a critical check on the
[E]xecutive."54 In emergencies, the court reasoned, no judge should
embarrass the executive in its efforts to win the war.55 On appeal, the U.S.
Supreme Court avoided the substantive issue, whether a military
commission can try a civilian, and denied certiorari on technical grounds.56
In Ex parte Milligan, Milligan, an Indiana lawyer charged with
conspiracy against the government, was tried before a military commission
which sentenced him to death.57 His petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was heard in 1866, two years after the war.58 The Court unanimously
granted the writ, holding that the trial was invalid. 9 However, the Court

sympathies for the enemy will be tried by military commissions. Id. at 95-96. Vallandigham, a
prominent politician and a former Congressman from Ohio, opposed the war and blamed Lincoln
and abolitionists for its initiation. Id.at 98. He urged both sides to begin peace negotiations and end
the bloodshed. Id. at 99. The charges were brought after speaking against that order. Id at 101.
51. STONE, supra note 50, at 101. The conviction generated tremendous backlash and is a
definitive point in the history of freedom of speech. For an expansive account of the proceedings
and the reactions, see Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War Speech in the
Civil War, 7 WM. E. MARY BILL RTS. J. 105 (1998). Many across the North (and of course in the
South) were outraged by the decision. Id. Mass protests ensued and all the newspapers carried the
story for a long time. Id. at 136. Lincoln himself, although displeased by Burnside's actions, had
to publish a response justifying the decision. Id. at 160-62.
52. Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 874.
53. STONE, supra note 50, at 103.
54. Id. at 104.
55. Vallandigham,28 F. Cas. at 922 ("It is clearly not a time when any one connected with
the judicial department of the government should allow himself, except from the most stringent
obligations of duty, to embarrass or thwart the executive in his efforts to deliver the country from
the dangers which press so heavily upon it") (Opinion of Leavitt, J.).
56. See Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243,248 (1963). The Court held it lacked appellate
jurisdiction to entertain Vallandigham's petition because a military commission was not a court
within the meaning of section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the courts of the
United States. Id. The Court also held that it did not have original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari to revise the proceedings of a military commission. Id.
57. William Rehnquist, CivilLibertyand the Civil War: The IndianapolisTreason Trials, 72
IND. L.J. 927, 932-33 (1997).
58. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
59. Id. at 135.
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was split on the reasons. Five Justices held that a U.S. citizen who is not
in the army could not be tried by a military commission as long as civilian
courts were open, and that the constitutional rights enjoyed by a criminal
defendant cannot be stripped away by an act of Congress or the
President.6 ° The four concurring Justices decided the case on narrower
grounds.61 They agreed the commission had no jurisdiction over Milligan,
but this was not because Congress lacked the power to subject citizens to
these commissions.62 They pointed to the Act relating to habeas corpus and
regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases of 1863, which, although
it allowed the President to suspend the writ, imposed limits on that right.63
The Act held that prisoners had to be turned over to the civil courts, where
they had to be indicted by a grand jury or released.' Thus, the Justices
held that Congress itself did not allow for trials of citizens by military
commissions.65
It is perhaps no coincidence that the most quoted decision from the war
was handed down two years after its completion, when Lincoln was
already dead and the general sentiment leaned more towards leniency than
perceived desert. This led some to pronounce that courts' roles in an
emergency situation should materialize after the emergency has passed.66
Be that as it may, what remains of the Civil War jurisprudence is the rule
advanced in the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Chase: when the
President wishes to exceed his power, congressional authorization is

60. Id. at 121-22. The laws of war
can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority of the
government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed...
Congress could grant no such power . . . One of the plainest constitutional
provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not
ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed
during good behavior.
Id. (Davis, J., opinion).
61. Id. at 122-23.
62. Id.
63. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 122-23.
64. Id. at 122.
65. Id. at 123 (there are cases in which, the privilege of the writ being suspended, trial and
punishment by military commission, in states where civil courts are open, may be authorized by
Congress, as well as arrest and detention. We think that Congress had power, though not exercised,
to authorize the military commission which was held in Indiana) (Chase, C.J., concurring).
66. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIviL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME (1998).
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required.67 Although that rule was not expressed in analytical fashion,
future cases implicitly or expressly adopted it.
Upon President Andrew Johnson's election a backlash ensued.
Congress restricted many powers formerly held by Lincoln and severely
limited his role in foreign affairs.68 This suggests that in emergencies
Congress will be more inclined to relinquish its checking power and rally
behind the President. As long as the crisis persists the courts are likely to
do the same.
2. World War II
The period prior to WWII continued the trend borne out in Milligan.
During WWI, the Wilson administration tended to follow the Milligan
plurality by insisting on receiving congressional authorizations. Congress
mostly deferred to the executive and so did the courts.69 Only after the war
had been over for ten years did the courts return to protecting civil liberties
at a "normal" level.7" During WWII, two events had a direct bearing on the
way the Court would make its decisions later on: the trial of the Nazi
Saboteurs and the internment of Japanese Americans.

67. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 123-24.
68. See Miller, supra note 29, at 246. See generallyWILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, ESSAYS
ON THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION AND RELATED TOPICs (1910) (discussing that there were
other reasons for why Congress did not trust Johnson. He was a Southerner, his conciliatorypolicies
toward the South during the Reconstruction angered Republicans in Congress, and he vetoed
several civil rights bills. This led to his impeachment in the House, although ultimately he was not
removed by the Senate).
69. ROSSITER, supra note 25, at 240-53.
70. In Moyer v. Peabody,212 U.S. 78 (1909), the Court upheld a detainment of a miner in
prison for 16 days after the governor of Colorado called in the National Guard to quell a strike.
When martial law was declared in West Virginia the strikers were convicted in military courts, even
though, unlike the holding in Ex parte Milligan, the courts were open. Congress enacted the
Espionage Act and the Sedition Act, prohibiting any speech construed to be disloyal. Even
academics were under fire for expressing views against these acts. Zachariah Chafee had to undergo
a committee inquiry to determine if he could continue teaching. The Court upheld the sedition act
and affirmed convictions of speech violations (Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 212 (1919), Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)). It was only
after the war was over that the Court returned to protect freedom of speech, first in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) and then in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). While doing
so it acknowledged that in wartime the scope of civil rights changed. See MICHAEL LINFIELD,
FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CrvIL LIBERTIES INTIMES OF WAR 33-67 (1990); STONE, supra note
50, at 136-233; Zachariah Chafee Jr., Freedom of Speech in Wartime, 32 HARv. L. REv. 932, 935
(1919); Maurer Maurer, The Court-Martialingof CampFollowers, 9 AM. J.LEGAL. HIST. 203,203
(1965); ALBERT F. GUNNS, CIVIL LIBERTIES INCRISIS: THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 1917-1940, at 1116 (1983).
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In June 1942 two German submarines landed eight German saboteurs in
Long Island and Florida, for the purpose of sabotaging military
installations. 7 After two saboteurs had a change of heart and turned to the
FBI, all of them were apprehended.7 2 Roosevelt decided they would be
tried by military commissions, and issued two proclamations to that effect,
despite concerns as to the constitutionality of the commissions, mainly,
whether the President had such an authority and whether two of saboteurs,
who were U.S citizens, could be subject to their authority.73 The saboteurs
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of their trial
before a military commission.74
The Court held that the President had authority to establish a military
commission to try the saboteurs, who were determined to be unlawful
combatants under international law.75 The authority to establish the
commission was not necessarily derived from the President's commanderin-chief power-the court left this issue undecided-so much as the
express congressional authorization.76 However, the Court still had to
distinguish Milligan. It pointed out that whereas Milligan was not a
member of the army and resided in a state which did not take part in the

71. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
72. Id. A fuller account can be found in Robert E. Cushman, Ex ParteQuirinEtAL-The Nazi
SaboteurCase,28 CORNELLL.Q. 54,54-56 (1942). See also Joseph R. Thysell Jr., ExParteQuirin:
The Casefor Military Commissions, 31 S.U. L. REV. 129, 130-32 (2004).
73. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 264-65 (2002).
74. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18
75. Id. at 48.
76. Id. at 29 ("It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the President
as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without the
support of Congressional legislation. For here Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the
law of war before such commissions") (Opinion of Stone, C.J.). The authorization was provided
by the Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593. Id. at 27. They recognized military commissions
as an appropriate tribunal for offenses against the law of war not ordinarily tried by court martial.
Id. Moreover, the Articles of War authorized the President to prescribe to the procedure for military
commissions. Id. As the Court noted:
Article 15 declares that "the provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction
upon courts martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions...
or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or
offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military
commissions ... or other military tribunals."
Id. This ordinarily included military personnel, but Article 12 did not exclude other person who is
subject to military commissions by the laws of war, such as the defendants in Quirin. Id. at 27.
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rebellion, the saboteurs were a part of the enemy's armed forces thus
subject to the law of war.7 7
The internment of Japanese Americans occasioned three important
decisions.78 The day the Japanese attacked, President Roosevelt issued a
proclamation restricting travel by Japanese aliens.7 9 Two months later,
Executive Order 9066 authorized the Secretary of War to prescribe
military areas and to exclude persons from these areas, leading to a
proclamation that the western states constitute military areas. 8' The
declared purpose was to prevent espionage and sabotage, although there
was no proof of such.8' This was followed by the decision to intern
110,000 Japanese Americans, 70,000 of whom were citizens.8" Concerns
over possible legal challenges led to the enactment of a statute making it
a federal misdemeanor
to violate any of the restrictions that followed from
83
the Executive Order.
In Hirabayashi,4 the Court upheld a curfew order imposed on people
of Japanese ancestry while affirming the principle that executive actions
regarding war powers must be authorized by Congress.8 Similar to Quirin,
the Court did not find it necessary to rule whether the President had

77. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46.
78. The Japanese air force attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7th 1941. Martial law was
immediately declared by the Hawaii governor, who also suspended the writ of habeas corpus after
receiving presidential approval. Military tribunals were established to adjudicate over civilian
matters, and although civilian courts resumed authority over the years of the war, the commissions
still tried people for civilian violations. It was only in 1946, after the war was over, that the Court
invalidated the jurisdictions of these commissions over civilian affairs. See Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). In Duncan, a habeas corpus case concerning the conviction of
two men by military commissions for committing civilian crimes, the Court held that the
commissions had no jurisdiction over civilian matters, thus affirming its ruling in Ex parte
Milligan. Admittedly this was too late. Martial law lasted until 1944 while the decision was in
1946. Thus, it can be argued that the Court had no real problem in affirming Milligan. See also
ROSSITER, supra note 25, at 284-85.
79. LINFIELD, supra note 70, at 92.
80. Id. at 92-93.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 92; Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster,54 YALE L.J.
489,496 (1945). For a recent review, see James McDonald, Democratic FailureandEmergencies:
Myth or Reality?, 93 VA. L. REV. 1785, 1805-20 (2007) (discussing the role of anti-Japanese
grassroots organizations that contributed to the internment).
83. An Act to provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons
entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or zones, approved March
21, 1942 (56 Stat. 173, 18 U.S.C.A. § 97a).
84. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
85. Id. at 104-05.
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inherent power to issue the order since there was congressional
authorization. 6
In Korematsuf the Court upheld the exclusion order ordering
Korematsu to leave his home. 8 Relying on Hirabayashi, the Court
grounded its decision on military necessity, but also on the congressional
authorization. 9 In Ex parte Endo,90 Endo argued she was a loyal citizen
and thus could not be placed in a detention center.9" The Court agreed, but
not because of the constitutional issues at stake, so much as on statutory
interpretation grounds.92 Since the purpose of the Orders and the Act was
to combat espionage and sabotage, loyal citizens should not be detained. 93
In other words, the Court reaffirmed its principle of congressional
authorization: the Act did not mention detention, only exclusion. The
detention system set up by the government exceeded this authority. 94Endo,
then, attempted to resolve the internment crisis upheld in Korematsu, but
on less controversial grounds. 95

86. Id. at 92.
Executive Order No. 9066 . . . and the Act of March 21, 1942, ratifying and
confirming the Executive Order, were each an exercise of the power to wage war
conferred on the Congress and on the President, as Commander in Chief of the
armed forces, by Articles I and II of the Constitution... We have no occasion to
consider whether the President, acting alone, could lawfully have made the curfew
order in question, or have authorized others to make it. For the President's action
has the support of the Act of Congress...
Id. (Opinion of Stone, C.J.).
87. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
88. Id. at 223-24.
89. Id. at 223.
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him
or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire ....
because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military
leaders-as inevitably it must-determined that they should have the power to do
just this.
Id. (Opinion of Black J.) (emphasis added).
90. Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
91. Id. at 294.
92. Id. at 300-04.
93. Id. at 302-04.
94. Rostow, supra note 82, at 513.
95. For an argument that Endo is the more important case of the two, see Patrick 0.
Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1933 (2003).
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The WWII cases entrenched the principle of congressional
authorization. As long as there was congressional authorization, the Court
was hesitant in proceeding further to check substantive individual rights
violations.
3. The Korean War
In response to the developing crisis in Korea, President Truman
declared a national emergency in 1950.96 The President, backed by
congressional authorization, seized property deemed necessary to the war
effort.97 The Courts stayed out of the picture as previous precedent
suggested the President had exclusive and plenary powers when it came
to foreign affairs. 98 This was construed by some to apply to matters of
national defense as well.99
Decided during the Korean War, Youngstown10 is arguably the most
important decision concerning the use of war powers; important in the
sense that it provided the analytical framework almost every use of war
power decision would later employ. In 1951 a labor dispute arose between
steel companies and their employees over the terms of their collective
bargaining agreements.' 01 Attempts to resolve the dispute failed. 10 2 The

96. Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 767, 773
(2002).
97. Id. By the 1970s, 15 years after the war ended, there were 470 emergency statutes
delegating power to the executive in a multitude of areas. Id.
98. Id. at 774.
99. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
[W]e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an
exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations-a power which does not require
as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable
provisions of the Constitution... congressional legislation... must often accord
to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover,
he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war.
Id. (Opinion of Sutherland, J.). See also

RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE
CONSTrUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 4 (2006).

100. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
101. Id. at 582.
102. Id. at 582-83.
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steel workers union gave notice of a nation-side strike." 3 Truman,
believing the impending strike would put national security at risk, issued
an executive order authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and
manage most of the country's steel mills."° The Secretary ordered the
0 5
mills to keep running while Truman reported his actions to Congress.
When Congress did not respond, Truman sent a second message. 0 6 It was
then that the steel companies filed suit claiming that the seizure lacked
congressional authorization. 0 7 The Government argued, in part, that the
seizure could be justified based on the President's inherent war powers as
commander-in-chief. 0 8
The Court disagreed.0 9 While it recognized that congressional
authorization was required for presidential seizure, it was divided as to the
nature of requisite authorization." 0 It was Justice Jackson who provided
the framework for the exercise of presidential power by invoking three
categories, the famous tripartite test."' The first category provides that
when the President acts according to express or implied authority from
Congress his authority is at its maximum." 2 The second category provides
that when the President acts in absence of either a permission or negation
from congress, he can only rely on his own power. 13 Here there is a zone
of twilight of overlapping authority where the distribution of power is
uncertain. The decision in these cases will depend on the circumstances.
The third category provides that when the President acts in a way that is
incompatible with Congress his force is at its lowest ebb, meaning that the
act is prohibited, unless he acts according to Article HI enumerated power
discounted by Congress's power over the matter.' 14
Jackson's categories explain the Civil War, WWI, and WWI
decisions: the President has power under the commander-in-chief clause.

103. Id. at 583.
104. Id.
105. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 584.
109. Id. at 587-88
110. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587-88. The Justices' reasoning stemmed from the Taft-Hartley
Act enacted in 1947 which purported to solve labor disputes by ruling out the use of presidential
seizures, deeming them counterproductive to the successful resolution of the dispute. The Act and
the history surrounding it demonstrated the President lacked the seizure power in this case.
111. Id. at 579, 635-38.
112. Id. at 635-37.
113. Id. at637.
114. Id. at 637-38.
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However, courts are reluctant to define its scope. Therefore, unless the
circumstances are clear, the Court would rather not delineate what this
power entails. Rather, it prefers that Congress authorizes the act so as to
guarantee its constitutionality.
4. Post 9/11 Enemy Combatant Cases
In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the USA
PATRIOT Act, and authorized the President to use military force (AUMF)
in order to prevent future terrorist attacks." 5 Soon after the war in
Afghanistan began, suspected Al-Qaeda members and Taliban fighters,
declared by President Bush as enemy combatants, were arrested and
detained in Guantanamo Bay Cuba.' 16 Similarly, two U.S. citizens and a
legal alien suspected of assisting Al-Qaeda were detained in American
prisons. 117
Rasul v. Bush" 8 addressed the question whether enemy combatants
could file habeas petitions. The government relied on a former decision
suggesting otherwise," 9 but the Rasul Court distinguished the case,
holding that the base in Guantanamo is an area where the United States
exercised complete jurisdiction and control.120 Relying on a federal habeas
corpus statute' 2' the Court held that any federal district court had
jurisdiction to hear Rasul's case. 122 To be sure, Congress can change the
statute, but as long as it did not the courts had jurisdiction. And indeed,
to repeal the right of habeas corpus for
two years later Congress attempted
23
detainees in Guantanamo Bay. 1

115. USA PATRIOT Act is the abbreviated term for the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (2001). On the Patriot Act, see generally Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making
of the USA PATRIOTAct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1145 (2003).
116. Steve Vogel, Afghan PrisonersGoingto GrayArea, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at AO 1.
117. The two citizens are Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi. The legal alien is Ali Saleh Kahlah
al-Marri, whose habeas petition was recently decided. See A1-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 163
(4th Cir. 2007).
118. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470-73 (2004).
119. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that a German citizen cannot file
for habeas corpus relief when he was convicted of war crimes by a military commission in China
and imprisoned in Germany).
120. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480 (Stevens, J., opinion).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2008).
122. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (Stevens, J., opinion).
123. 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(1) (2008).
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In Padilla,Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, was arrested in Chicago in 2002
suspected of planning to detonate a "dirty bomb.' ' 124 Declared an enemy
combatant, he was held without charges, trial or access to counsel.2 5 His
petition to the New York District Court was partially successful, in that the
Court recognized the President's power under the AUMF to detain as
enemy combatants citizens apprehended in the United States during a time
of war, but it also held that Padilla had a right to contest the facts
constituting his detainment. 126 The Second Circuit went a step further and
held the President lacked power to detain U.S. citizens who were arrested
on American soil and not in the zone of combat.127 The Court relied on
Youngstown, holding the AUMF did not provide the requisite
authorization.

2

The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case, 129 and then

denied certiorari when the case came before it again. 3
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,13 ' a U.S. citizen, picked up in Afghanistan, was
initially brought to Guantanamo and later removed to South Carolina. In
his habeas petition he argued that the President had no authority to detain
him, and further, that his detainment violated the Non Detention Act,

No court,justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application
for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United
States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
This section was later struck down in Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S.Ct. 3078 (2007).
124. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
125. Id.
126. Padilla ex. rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
127. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 723 (2d Cir. 2003).
128. Id. The AUMF provides in relevant part:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224.
129. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). The 5-4 majority avoided the substantive
issue by holding that Padilla should have filed the original petition in South Carolina, the federal
district he was detained, and not in New York, where he was initially held. Padilla re-filed the case
in South Carolina, where the Fourth Circuit rejected his claims.
130. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
131. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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which prohibited detention unless pursuant to an act of Congress. 3 2 The
government relied on the AUMF, arguing that it provided the necessary
congressional authorization, and that the president
also had inherent
33
authority as commander-in-chief to detain him.1
The Court, in a three Justice plurality written by Justice O'Connor,
declined to decide on the issue of inherent power, finding that the AUMF
provided authority to detain persons who fought against the United States
in Afghanistan. 3 3 Detainment in these cases, the Court noted, was a
fundamental incident of war included in the AUMF.13 Regarding due
process rights, Justice O'Connor applied a balancing test, holding that
Hamdi must be given access to counsel so he could challenge his
designation as an enemy combatant before a neutral decisionmaker.'36
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,17 termed by Harold Koh as "Youngstown for
the twenty-first century,' ' 138 the Court decided whether Hamdan, at one
point Bin-Laden's driver, could be tried before a military commission set
up in an executive order. Hamdan argued that the commissions were void
because they lacked congressional authorization, violating the Uniform
Code of Military Justice 139 (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions. 4 ° The
Government relied on Exparte Quirin, 4' and also argued that Congress
authorized the commission in the AUMF. The Court struck down the
military commissions, holding that they did not conform to the
Youngstown framework. 142 The Court held that while military commissions
are not unconstitutional per se, they have to be properly established. ' The
problem was that the AUMF did not expand the President's authority to
establish military commissions under the UCMJ, 4 and the existing

132. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006) provides: "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." The Act was enacted as a
result of the Japanese-American internment in WWII.
133. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 1,at 2071. These later became known as the CSRT
(Combatant Status Review Tribunals), the procedures of which are challenged in Boumediene v.
Bush, No. 06-1195 (U.S. June 12, 2008).
137. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
138. Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2364 (2006).
139. 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006).
140. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567 (Opinion of Stevens, J.).
141. ExparteQuirin,317 U.S. 1 (1942).
142. Id.at 2799 (Chief Justice Roberts did not participate since he was one of thejudges who
heard the case in the D.C. Circuit).
143. Id.
144. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 592 (Opinion of Stevens, J.).
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commissions deviated from UCMJ standards because the laws of war in
the Geneva Conventions that apply through the UCMJ call for judgment
to be passed by a "regularly constituted court."' 4 5 Because the military
commissions deviated from numerous requirements of procedural justice
found in the UCMJ (mostly regarding juries and evidentiary standards)
they were not considered
a "regularly constituted court" and were
46
therefore invalid.
The Bush Administration thus returned to Congress for express
authorization. This led to the enactment of the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 (MCA), which basically adopts the military commissions set up
by the executive. 47 Furthermore, the MCA attempted to repeal habeas
rights for Guantanamo detainees. 148 However, in June 2008 the Court
struck down the provision in the MCA which sought to strip habeas rights
from enemy combatants. 49 In a closely divided decision, which is a
seeming departure from the Court's jurisprudence discussed thus far, the
Court was not satisfied with the presence of congressional authorization
and held that Congress did not validly take away the detainees' habeas
rights. To do that, the Court argued, Congress needed to comply with the
Constitution's Suspension Clause, which permits suspension of habeas
only in rebellion or invasion. The Court noted that Congress may set up an
alternative process for guaranteeing habeas rights, but the process set up
in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 was not an "adequate and effective
145. Id. at 567 (Opinion of Stevens, J.).
146.
The Court's conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not
issued the Executive a "blank check." . .. Indeed, Congress has denied the
President the legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind at
issue here. Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the
authority he believes necessary. Where, as here, no emergency prevents
consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not
weaken our Nation's ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that insistence
strengthens the Nation's ability to determine-through democratic means-how best
to do so. The Constitution places its faith in those democratic means. Our Court
today simply does the same.
Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
147. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17,2006).
148. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
149. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. _
(2008), 128 S. Ct. 2229, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1195.pdf(last visited June 15,2008). The D.C.
Circuit Court, relying on Rasul, chose to apply the Youngstown framework by holding that
congressional authorization suffices to deny habeas rights to Guantanamo detainees. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 375 U.S. App. D.C. 48; 476 F.3d 981; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682.
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substitute for the habeas writ," which is why the purported suspension
cannot stand. 5 '
C. The Importance of CongressionalAuthorization
While most of the literature after the enemy combatant cases focused
on the substantive issues the courts dealt with, 5 ' few emphasized the
structural framework the courts employ, crystallized in Justice Jackson's
opinion in Youngstown. While there have been some deviations now and
then, such as the Court's opinion regarding due process requirements in
Hamdi, the Youngstown categories serve as a litmus test for the legality of
executive power. Indeed, the decisions before Youngstown embraced
similar principles without providing the analytical framework. To be sure,
the fact that executive actions in times of crisis require congressional
authorization did not escape legal scholars. 5 2 However, while most
commentators pointed to the virtues of such a framework, few have
addressed the problems it entails. In the two sections that follow I
elaborate on each.
1. The Virtues of the Youngstown Framework
Enforcing the separation of powers scheme makes sense. As the
Constitution does not assign a specific role for the judiciary in
emergencies, the courts impose the general constitutional design on the
branches that were vested with war-making power. ' Because the Framers
wanted to prevent the concentration of too much power in the hands of one
branch, the purpose for separating the powers and having them check each

150. Boumediene, 375 U.S. at 67 (Opinion of Kennedy, J.). The alternative process, the CSRT
lacks certain safeguards the Court thought were essential for a habeas substitute, such as the
assistance of counsel for the combatant, an ability to rebut the government's factual assertion that
he is, in fact, a combatant, and his ability to confront witnesses which the Court opined was
"theoretical" given that there are no limits to admission of hearsay statements. See id. at 49-57
(Opinion of Kennedy, J.).
151. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 99; TERRORISM, THE LAW OF WAR, AND THE
CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY COMBATANTS CASES (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005); Martha
Minow, What is the Greatest Evil?, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2134 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Detainees, 68 ALB. L. REv. 1119 (2005).
152. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2047 (2005); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging
War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002); Cass R.
Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2663, 2669-70, 2672 (2005).
153. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court in Crisis:How WarAffects Only Non-War Cases,
80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (2005).
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other was to impede, rather than accelerate, government action. 5 4 Checks
and balances were designed to encourage deliberation among government
entities.'55 Mutual checks were thought to be a good way for ambition to
counter ambition.5 6 That way, only when the branches were in agreement
could action be taken. This creates incentives for inter-branch bargaining
and, as a result, makes the decision making process more deliberative) 57
The Framers' vision was that Congress would be the big player, but they
also granted strong powers to the executive. The courts were assigned a
monitoring duty, making sure that the general scheme did not malfunction
and that there would be multiple centers of political158authority that can
check each other for unwarranted accretion of power.
In the context of the war-making powers maintaining this structure was
extremely important. War is a stressful time, so the Constitution was
arranged such that these kinds of decisions (specifically going to war)
would not be easy to make. As John Hart Ely put it, the point was to "clog
the road to combat by requiring the concurrence of a number of people of
various points of view."' 59 Congress, the Framers thought, can serve as a
meaningful check on presidential power thus making for better decisions.
The meaningful check is interbranch dialogue. If you get the two branches
talking this will ensure a "sustained democratic response to external
crisis. ' This also comports with our notion of the rule of law. Congress
enacts the laws which the President must faithfully execute. He must act
within the scope authorized by Congress. Congress, on its part, is supposed
to oversee the crisis. It tries to prevent mistakes, either by expressing more
viewpoints or harnessing past experience. It can also cut waste and make
sure policymakers are alert.' 6
In short, the Constitution eschews unilateral executive action, except
in the clear case where it grants that power to the executive. When the
branches are in agreement, the requirement is satisfied, the court is equally

154. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725
(1996).
155. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 7-13 (1993).
156. THE FEDERALISTNO. 51, at 317 (James Madison).
157. MARK TUSHNET, CENTRALAMERICA AND THE LAW: THE CONSTITUTION, CIVILLIBERTIES
AND THE COURTS 18-19 (1988).

158. Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority: The Role of
Courts in a Time of ConstitutionalChange, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 871, 882 (2007).
159. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM
AND ITS AFTERMATH 4 (1993).
160. Koh, supra note 138, at 2364.
161. Norman J. Omstein & Thomas E. Mann, When Congress Checks Out, 85 FOREIGN AFF.

67 (2006).
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less likely to intervene and will not be perceived as an activist in issues
where it lacks institutional competence or legitimacy. Now, this is
62
basically the argument made by Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes. 1
They argue that the courts' role in times of crisis is to make sure that the
right institutional process supports the tradeoff between liberty and
security. 163 They correctly observe that in times of crisis courts usually do
not address legal issues through the framework of individual rights, but
also refrain from granting unfettered discretion to the executive. Instead,
the courts employ a process based institutional approach, whereby they
shift responsibility from themselves and pass it to Congress so it can check
the executive.164
In the following section, I suggest that the seemingly straightforward
institutional process based approach can almost always be applied and
therefore does not pose a real constraint. Moreover, it systematically and
ultimately fails at curbing unilateral executive action. However, the
Youngstown framework does do at least one good thing. By avoiding
substantive judgments and narrowing itself to statutory interpretation the
Court frees up the political process. It calls on the political branches to
cooperate and work together. It signals to them that the answer should be
found in the political process rather than through constitutional law. And,
in a way, the results can motivate Congress to become a more active
participant in shaping national security policy.'65
2. The Problems with Youngstown
Because the Youngstown categories are vague, it is notoriously easy (or
difficult, depending on your desired result) to apply. Youngstown itself was
a complicated case because it required determining exactly what Congress
gave permission to do, given that there was no clear statute on point. There
are statutes that are in the neighborhood which specify a set of methods the
President could have used to resolve a labor dispute, but one needs to
interpret them in a certain way to conclude that the seizure is
unconstitutional. Also, merely having a statute is not enough since one can
still ask whether it grants authority or denies it. Because this is a matter of

162. Samuel Issacharoff& Richard D. P ildes, Between Civil Libertarianismand Executive
Unilateralism:An InstitutionalProcessApproach to Rights During Wartime, in THE CONSTITUTION
IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 166 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
163. Id. at 194.
164. Id. at 162-63.
165. Whether that is a good thing is another question. For an opinion that more weight and
power should be given to the executive in times of emergency, see POSNER & VERMEULE, supra
note 5.
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interpretation, courts have enough room to play around the categories. This
point is particularly prominent in two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Haig v.
Agee166 and Dames & Moore v. Reagan,'67 where the Court adopted a
broad notion of what constitutes congressional authorization.
In a similar vein, there are a lot of statutes to go through, virtually the
entire U.S. code. Conceivably then, it is just a matter of finding a statute
that comports with the preferred outcome.' 68 And, of course, there is
Justice Jackson's second category-the zone of twilight. If Congress does
not say anything then there is no clear answer, or at least there are no clear
guidelines. More so than that, what would be the decision in a case where
the President acted within his Article II powers and Congress limited that
action by exercising its Article I powers? The Youngstown framework
gives us no answer to this predicament.
Thus, it is a real question whether the institutional process based
approach can serve as a meaningful check on an executive determined to
exercise its war powers. Contrary to Issacharoff and Pildes, five reasons
suggest that it cannot.
First, the Framers assumed that there will be contention between
169
Congress and the President. Issacharoff and Pildes assume this as well.
But this is not always the case. For one thing, the Framers did not envision
the party system that exists today. In fact, they generally abhorred the idea
of political parties. 7 ' More importantly, when the presidency and
Congress are controlled by the same party, in a situation of undivided
government, more often than not they will share policy preferences. In
these cases it is hard to see how Congress can seriously impede executive
action.71 ' Indeed, why should it? This was striking after the events of
September 11 when President Bush enjoyed a Republican Congress from

166. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
167. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
168. Thus, for example, the Court in Rasul relied on habeas corpus statute provisions enacted
in 1867, and the Hamdan Court relied on UCMJ provisions enacted in 1950. Rasul v. Bush 542
U.S. 466,473 (2004) (Opinion of Stevens, J.); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,593 n.22 (2006)
(Opinion of Stevens, J.).
169. Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 162, at 191.
170. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICiAL REVIEW 165-67 (2004).

171. For a similar argument, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard D. Pildes, SeparationofParties,
Not Powers, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2311, 2351 (2006) ("The Madisonian visions founders on the
realities of partisan political competition. Especially when government is unified by party, we
should not expect Congress to resist executive power in the way that courts and commentators take
for granted") (the authors then go on to analyze congressional behavior post 9/11 to find that
Congress has been largely dormant).
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2003 up until 2007. Congress has routinely either failed or acquiesced in
the face of a determined executive. Of course, this is not because Congress
was determined to curtail unilateral executive action and failed to do so,
but because for the most part it happened to agree with the President's
policies, so there was no need to object. And, even if individual members
did not agree with a specific policy there are incentives to toe the party
line, which may "force" them to agree.
Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann, for example, observe that "In the
mid-1990s, the Republican Congress took 140 hours of testimony on
whether President Clinton had used his Christmas mailing list to find
potential campaign donors; in 2004-5, House Republicans took 12 hours
of testimony on Abu Ghraib."' 72 To be sure, Congress is perfectly capable
to stand up to the President even when both branches are controlled by the
same party. Such was the case in the enacting of the "McCain
Amendment" seeking to prohibit cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
of detainees in U.S. custody and restricting interrogation techniques to
those limited in the Army field manual.'73
The same happened after Hamdan, where the President struggled
against a group led by Senators John McCain, Lindsay Graham, and Mark
Warner, ultimately "compromising" on the content of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006.'4 However, this is the exception rather than the
rule. As a result, some commentators have called for a default rule against
"latitudinous interpretations in support of executive power during unified

172. Omstein &Mann, supra note 161. However, the authors identify a decline in institutional
authority that has been taking place since the 1980s, causing Congress to be more deferential when
confronting the executive, caring more about their constituencies than about national affairs. Id.
173. Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). When President
Bush signed the Act, he attached a signing statement which said:
The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to
detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President
to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and
consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will
assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President,
evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist
attacks.
President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic
Influenza Act, 2006," The White House, availableat http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/12/20051230-8.html).
174. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006), enacting Chapter 47A of title 10 of
the U.S. Code (as well as amending section 2241 of title 28).
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government" so as to force congressional deliberation in the hope that
Congress will undertake
its power sharing constitutional responsibility
75
with the executive.
Second, since the time of the framing the executive has gradually been
accreting power. 7 6 Consider, for instance, the modem administrative state.
Congress regularly delegates its legislating authority to government
agencies which are controlled by the executive, arguably violating Article
I non-delegation doctrine. 177 Concentration of war powers is simply a part
of a larger process that has steadily been taking place for the past 200
years, accelerating since the New Deal. 78 The courts, for the most part,
refrained from intervening, realizing perhaps that modem times necessitate
a bigger and more complex governmental mechanism, but also because
they believed that the 79separation of powers scheme is largely a selfenforcing mechanism. 1
Not only is the executive already powerful, in emergencies there is a
natural tendency to "rally around the flag."' 80 In times of crisis, real or
perceived, the nation rallies behind the leader. Sometimes this is due to
patriotic fervor, sometimes panic, but the President almost always has
wide support in the beginning of a war or national crisis. This support
comes from the citizenry, but also from Congress, which usually exhibits
a high degree of deference to executive action, not wanting to "rock the
boat," or perhaps happy to shift responsibility to the President. Because the
realities of war require a central leadership that can operate quickly and
decisively it is reasonable to entrust these duties to the executive branch
as opposed to a collective body like Congress.
Third, there will be cases where the Court will strike down a
presidential act, even in a time of crisis, if it did not receive congressional
authorization. But this is not necessarily a rebuke.' 8 ' The Court in Rasul
and Hamdan gave specific instructions to the President how to legalize his

175. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 171, at 2356.
176. For a description, see Flaherty, supra note 154.
177. See Gary Lawson, The Rise andRise of the AdministrativeState, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231
(1994) (arguing that the administrative state is unconstitutional because it violates the nondelegation principle).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (showing
that Congress tried to reassert its power vis-i-vis the INS, only to be struck down by the Court).
180. Mark Tushnet, ControllingExecutive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2673, 2678 (2005).
181. See John Yoo, Courtsat War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573 (2006) (arguing that the recent
Court decisions regarding enemy combatants affirmed the notion of the "war on terror" and
provided a flexible framework for the administration).
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actions. 182 Sure enough, the President went to Congress which promptly
authorized the suspension of habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees and
reformulated military commissions to comply with the decisions.8 3 In
times of crisis this authorization is almost a sure thing, so even if the
President failed to acquire congressional authorization ex ante, it will not
be too difficult getting authorization ex post. When the Court is merely
enforcing a process, virtually any substantive decision can pass
constitutional muster as long as it received congressional authorization.
This can be good or bad, depending on one's perspective, but it does mean
that, as long as there is authorization, almost any measure has the potential
to receive a judicial stamp of approval.'84
Fourth, even if Congress tries to perform a meaningful check on
executive action, there is a good chance it will fail. A case in point is the
War Powers Resolution. The War Powers Resolution attempts to force
interbranch dialogue by requiring the President to consult Congress before
engaging in hostilities, to give regular reports to Congress, and to
withdraw troops within sixty days absent congressional approval.'85 But
86
the resolution has mostly been ineffectual.

182. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1).
184. Benjamin Wittes, JudicialBaby-Splitting and the Failureof the PoliticalBranches, in
TERRORISM, THE LAW OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY COMBATANTS

CASES 101, 117-18 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005).
The simple truth is that the administration could have gotten almost anything it
wanted from Congress in the way of detention authority for enemy aliens abroad
in the wake of September 11. If the debate over the USA Patriot Act proved
anything, it was that Congress had little appetite for standing in the way of the
most robust response the executive could muster ... [I]t is simply inconceivable
that Congress would have crafted a regime that did not amply accommodate the
president's wartime needs... [Had the President gone to Congress] I believe the
deference he sought from the Supreme Court would have been forthcoming and
very nearly absolute.
Id.
185. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973).
186. David Cole, The Priorityof Morality: the Emergency Constitution'sBlind Spot, 113
YALE. L.J 1753, 1765 (2004); Ratner & Cole, supra note 28 (noting that presidents have not
respected the Resolution and that the courts have been reluctant to enforce it); Kelly L. Cowan,
Rethinking the War Powers Resolution:a StrengthenedCheckon UnfetteredPresidentialDecision
Making Abroad, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 99 (2004) (arguing that the War Powers Resolution
generally failed in the past and that it needs amending if it is to deal successfully with terrorism).
For a different view challenging the conventional wisdom, see Eileen Burgin, Rethinking the Role
of the War Powers Resolution: Congress and the PersianGulf War, 21 J. LEGIS. 23 (1995).
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Fifth, it is possible that congressional authorization actually eggs the
President on as opposed to restricting him. According to Ely,
congressional power sharing slows down the war-making process; 87 but
some argue that congressional authorizations in the war powers context
may have perverse effects, since by distributing responsibility to more
branches the President will be more comfortable in pursuing higher
risk
88
wars than he otherwise would choose were he to act unilaterally.1
3. A Possible Wrinkle: a Substantive Impulse
Before proceeding, it is important to introduce a possible wrinkle to the
foregoing analysis. Part of the criticism leveled against the institutional
process based approach is that by maintaining the separation of powers
and seeking congressional authorization, the Court is abdicating its role as
a protector of individual rights. 89
' Insistence on process invites the political
branches to violate individual liberties during crisis, precisely when they
are most vulnerable.' 90 There is some evidence suggesting that the courts
have been more receptive to such arguments. The plurality opinion in
Hamdi, where the Court provided a minimal due process guarantee by
allowing each detainee to contest his designation as an enemy combatant,
is a good example.' 9' In their Hamdi dissent, Justices Scalia and Stevens
went even further by arguing that the Constitution allows the detention of
an American citizen only when a criminal prosecution is in place and all
the constitutional rights have been provided, regardless of an emergency
or a congressional authorization.' 92 The Court in Boumediene is a possible
signal that merely having congressional authorization may not suffice. 93

187. See ELY, supra note 159.
188. See Jide Nzelibe, Are CongressionallyAuthorizedWars Perverse?,59 STAN. L. REv. 907
(2007). Admittedly, that line of thought is perverse in itself. It implies that we should only go to
war only when it is controversial. Moreover, it confuses the order of causation. The President will
only get authorization when there is already consensus, but it does not induce him to present a
higher risk war to Congress than was already contemplated. While it might give him more leeway
in the war itself, it will not induce him to present a higher risk war to Congress. When war is
necessary, we would want the government to pursue it despite the risk. I am indebted to Yuval
Abrams for this point.
189. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the Internment 's
Shadow, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 255 (2005) (arguing that this mechanism removes
accountability from the courts and the political branches for civil rights violations).
190. Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown: Justice Jackson's Wartime Security
Jurisprudenceand the Detention of "Enemy Combatants," 68 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1135 (2005).
191. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (Opinion of O'Connor, J.).
192. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. However, that examination will most likely be limited to few substantive issues, and not
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It is too soon to tell whether this possible move to a more substantive
individual rights approach during emergencies is here to stay. It is true that
Boumediene has somewhat deviated from this trend, but even there
Congress can respond by providing an alternative process which serves as
an adequate substitute to the writ. There are other possible explanations for
the ruling: the writ of habeas corpus is traditionally regarded as an issue
ofjudicial competence and the most important judicial protection against
arbitrary arrests, so it is natural that the Court would be more vigilant in
this area. Unlike other areas, habeas corpus is explicitly addressed in the
Constitution, so the Court has something tangible to latch on to. It will be
interesting to see the Court's treatment of intelligence surveillance, for
example, where the Fourth Amendment's requirement of an unreasonable
search or seizure is more ambiguous.
One can also argue that today we are more sensitive to individual rights
concerns than we were back in the Civil War or WWII. Over time, these
sensitivities come to be reflected in the opinions of the Justices we appoint
to the Court, who embody these preferences themselves. 94 Indeed, the
Boumediene decision might be explained along the lines of the Court's
recognition of the waning public support for the "War on Terror" and its
impact on individual rights.'95 Whether we are indeed witnessing a sea
change in crisis jurisprudence or whether these are exceptions, has yet to
be determined conclusively. If induction is any guide, I am not certain the
basic structure will change. In a system of separated powers the courts
have traditionally assumed a modest role, and the cases where they
intervened can be explained on the basis of specific historical
contingencies.' 96 Ultimately, then, the separation of powers scheme plays
an important role in the kind of reasoning the courts employ. 97
the host of issues the appellants addressed in their briefs. Justin Florence, Substantive Detention
Law Matters: TheBig Questions About Guantanamothe Supreme CourtShouldAnswer, HARV. L.
POL'Y REV. ONLINE, available at http://www.hlpronline.com/FlorenceSubstantiveDetention_
Law.pdf (last visited on Feb. 6,2008).
194. Goldsmith & Sunstein, supranote 73. For the argument that popular opinion shapes legal
doctrine, see Barry Friedman, Dialogueand JudicialReview, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993); Barry
Friedman, MediatedPopularConstitutionalism,101 MICH. L. REV. 2596,2615 (2003).
195. Jack Balkin makes a somewhat similar point on his blog, "Balkinization." Jack Balkin,
This is What a FailedRevolution Looks Like (June 13, 2008), availableat http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2008/06/this-is-what-failed-revolution-looks.html (last visited on June 16, 2008).
196. The Court's decisions in Milligan,Duncan,and Endo, are regarded as "brave," but they
were decided after the crisis was over (in Milligan the Civil War, in Duncan WWII), or when the
end was in sight and the outcome clear (Endo).
197. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Enemy Combatant Cases in Historical Context: The
Inevitability of PragmaticJudicialReview, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1083 (2007) (arguing
that "it would be a mistake to interpret the recent cases upholding the rights of enemy combatants
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D. Summary
The possible wrinkle aside, it seems clear that the Youngstown
framework does not serve as a real check on executive power. If the courts
are only enforcing the separation of powers scheme then they are not doing
much, except, perhaps, calling on Congress to work with or against the
President. But since congressional authorization is very easy to get in
times of crisis, especially when the executive and legislative branches
share similar policy preferences, this is not a major hurdle.
Moreover, if the Court really wants to find authorization then
interpretive acrobatics can yield the desired outcome. It is true that the
Court sometimes opposes executive actions, but many times the
circumstances surrounding the case are more illuminating than the
decisions themselves. 98
Judicial deference, the result of the Youngstown framework, flows from
the structure of separation of powers. Thus, the question is what happens
in countries with a different separation of powers scheme. The next section
examines crisis adjudication in Israel, where I will suggest that one of the
factors leading to different substantive judicial decisions is that the Israel
Supreme Court does not view its role as the enforcer of separation of
powers. When courts are not applying a structural model they are more
likely to apply a substantive individual rights model, according less
deference to the executive.
IV. ISRAELI CRISIS ADJUDICATION
A. Introduction
Unlike the United States, which has fairly distinct periods of peace and
crisis, Israel can be characterized as a country having one long crisis since
its founding in 1948. Wars, the imposition of military law on the
Palestinian minority within Israel until 1966,'99 the occupation of the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank as a result of the Six Day War in 1967,200 and
as portending a more general shift toward greater protection of individual liberty in the military
context. History has taught us that such decisions are the exception, not the rule. During wartime,
judicial discretion is usually the better part of valor.").
198. See supra text accompanying note 196.
199. See generally DAvID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF ARABS IN ISRAEL (1990).

200. As part of the disengagement plan, Israel pulled out of the Gaza Strip and evacuated its
settlements in August 2005. Whether Israel still has effective control over that territory and whether
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persistent terrorist attacks, have been fertile ground for the adoption of
varied security measures dealing with issues such as detainment,
deportation, house demolitions, torture, targeted killings, the Separation
Barrier, and immigration policy. Indeed, Israel has been under a formal
state of emergency since 1948.201 However, when discussing crisis
adjudication this formal declaration of emergency is relatively
inconsequential. 2 2 Rather than describe the legal situation in each area, I
aim to paint a picture of how the courts resolve crisis cases.
I begin with a description of the Israeli constitutional system focusing
on the "constitutional revolution" in 1992 and key judicial doctrines
relating to standing and justiciability. 231 I then examine crisis adjudication
and the willingness of courts to substantively resolve such disputes over
a general policy of deference. Last, I suggest some reasons why this is so
and why the courts in Israel assume a different role than U.S courts.
Specifically, I speculate that one of the reasons accounting for the
difference is the separation of powers scheme in Israel resulting in the
Knesset's (Israel's parliament) inability to pose a meaningful check on

it still has duties to the inhabitants under international law is controversial. These complex issues
are not within the scope of this Article.
201. The declaration was enacted in section 9 ofthe Law and Administration Ordinance-1948,
which was the first piece of Israeli legislation. Official Gazette, No. 2, app. A, at 1 (May 1, 1948).
Maintaining a state of emergency enables the operation of many laws concerning detentions,
arrests, price control, labor laws. which can be enacted in a very speedy way, mainly by executive
officials rather than the legislature. The authority to declare an emergency has since been relocated
to section 38 of the Basic Law: The Government, but a state of emergency is still in effect, the
Knesset extending it every six months or a year. Basic Law: The Government, § 38, S.H. 1780, at
158 (Mar. 3, 2001). A petition to the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the
continued state of emergency has received some sympathy from the Court, and the Government has
been attempting to integrate the vast legislation dependent on a declaration of emergency with
regular legislation. The petition is still pending. See H.C.J. 3091/99 The Association for Civil
Rights in Israel v. The Knesset [2006] (yet to be published). See also Claude Klein, On the Three
Floors of a Legislative Building: Israel's Legal Arsenal in its Struggle Against Terrorism, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2223, 2234 (2006).
202. This is not to say that it is not important. Indeed, detentions, for example, are governed
by a law that requires that a state of emergency be in effect. However, that law or a similar version
thereof, would probably have been enacted anyways. Regarding the occupied territories, the
emergency laws that apply there are a remnant of the British Mandate and do not rely on the Israeli
emergency declaration. For a critical position on Israel's continuing emergency declaration, see
John Quigley, Israel'sForty-Five Year Emergency: Are There Time Limits to Derogationsfrom
Human Rights Obligations?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 491 (1994).
203. The term was coined by then Justice of the Israel Supreme Court, Aharon Barak. See
Aharon Barak, The ConstitutionalRevolution: ProtectedHuman Rights, 1 MSI-IPAT UMIMsHAL 9
(1993) (Hebrew).
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executive power. Consequently, the system promotes judicial, rather than
legislative, oversight.
B. The Israeli ConstitutionalStructure
Israel is a parliamentary democracy modeled after the British system
of government.2" The largest party forms a coalition with smaller parties
for a majority of the seats, going on to form the government. This means
that by definition the government has the majority of the Knesset. Of
course, political turmoil and breakups of coalitions can occur, resulting in
the loss of Knesset confidence in the government.2 °5
The Declaration of Independence provided that Israel shall have a
constitution, enacted by a constituent assembly. 2°6 But in its first
legislative act, the Constituent Assembly determined that it should become
the first Knesset.2 7 Due to political difficulties, the first Knesset did not
enact a constitution, but decided on a compromise, known as the Harari
Resolution, to hand over the enactment process to a Knesset committee,
instructing that the constitution be composed in piecemeal fashion of
individual chapters, each constituting a basic law. 2 8 The Basic Laws were
not considered to have supreme status over other legislation.20 9
In 1992 the Knesset enacted two Basic Laws dealing with individual
rights: Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation.210 Up until that point some individual rights were judicially
protected, but the Knesset could restrict these rights. The Israeli Supreme
Court performed judicial review over administrative actions and policies,
but did not exercise judicial review over primary legislation,2 ' although

204. For a full although a bit dated description ofthe Israeli legal system, see Asher Maoz, The
System of Government in Israel, 8 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 9 (1988).
205. The specific provisions regarding these arrangements are stipulated in the Basic Law: The
Knesset and the Basic Law: The Government.
206. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 LSI 3 (1948).
207. Transition Law, 1949, S.H. 5709, 1.
208. An English translation of all of the Basic Laws can be found at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/engmimshal_yesod l.htm.
209. However, the Supreme Court has held that the Knesset can entrench statutory provisions
requiring supermajorities for their amendment, see H.C.J. 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance
[1969] Isr. S.C. 23(1) 693.
210. The rights protected in these Basic Laws are the rights to dignity, liberty, movement,
property, privacy, and occupation. Other individual rights have been developed and derived for the
general right to liberty, such as a constitutional right to freedom of speech and assembly, religious
liberty, and a general constitutional principle of equality. See Hillel Sommer, The Unenumerated
Rights-On the Scope of the ConstitutionalRevolution, 28 MISHPATIM 257 (1997) (Hebrew).
211. Dalia Domer, Does IsraelHave a Constitution?,43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1325, 1327(1999).
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it did hold that laws should be construed so as to avoid impairing these
rights.212
In 1995 the Court established judicial review over Knesset legislation.
In UnitedMizrachi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village,213 the Court held
that the Basic Laws are normatively superior to Knesset legislation and
that Knesset legislation violating the rights protected in these Basic Laws
that are not in accordance with their limitations clause will be struck down
by the courts.2 14 The limitation clause introduced the concept of
proportionality to Israeli jurisprudence.2" 5
This process was also accompanied by the gradual accretion of power
by the Court. Due to a model remnant of British Mandatory rule, the Court
serves not only as a court of criminal and civil appeals, but also sits as a
court of first instance as a High Court of Justice.2 16 In this capacity it has

212. Marcia Gelpe, Constraintson Supreme CourtAuthority in Israeland the United States:
PhenomenalCosmic Powers; Itty Bitty Living Space, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 493, 506-08 (1999).
213. CA 6821/93 United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995] Isr. S.C. 49(4)
221. English translation available in 31 ISR. L. REV. 744, 746 (1997).
214. Section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides that "There shall be no
violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel,
enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required." An almost identical
clause is found in section 4 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. See also Daphne BarakErez, Froman Unwritten to a Written Constitution:The lsraeliChallengeinAmericanPerspective,
26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309,312-31 (1995); Yehudit Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty: A Biography of Power Struggles, I MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 323 (1993) (Hebrew). For a
critical analysis of Israel's "struggle for a constitution," see Michael Mandel, Democracyand the
New Constitutionalismin Israel, 33 ISR. L. REV. 259 (1999) (arguing that the purpose of the
constitutional revolution was to consolidate the power of those who lost it on the political front).
For an approach arguing that the constitutional revolution served to entrench neo-liberal principles
thus ignoring Israel's socialist and collectivist background, see Ran Hirschl, Israel's
"Constitutional Revolution ": The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties in an
Emerging Neo-LiberalEconomic Order,46 AM. J. COMP. L. 427 (1998).
215. H.C.J. 1715/97 Lishkat Menhalei Hahashkaot in Israel v. Minister of Finance [1997 Isr.
S.C. 541(1) 367; R. v. Oakes [ 1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. The test is composed of three sub-tests: (1) The
means taken must be rationally connected to the purpose; (2) The means have to impair the right
as little as possible; and (3) The harm caused to the individual has to be proportionate to the
benefits brought on by the action. Id. at 139 (Dickson, C.J., opinion). For an elaboration on the
reasonableness and proportionality requirements in administrative law, see Baruch Bracha,
ConstitutionalUpgradingofHuman Rights in Israel: The Impact ofAdministrative Law, 3 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 581, 634-39 (2001).
216. § 15 to the Basic Law: the Judiciary. This provides among others:
(c) The Supreme Court shall sit also as a High Court of Justice. When so sitting,
it shall hear matters in which it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake of
justice and which are not within the jurisdiction of another court...
(d) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (c), the
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expansive powers, which include review of all administrative bodies and
officials.2" 7 Of course, the Court can still proscribe its standing and
justiciability requirements, but these were significantly eroded by the
Court itself. In an important decision concerning the drafting of ultraorthodox men to the military, the Court held that the lack of a personal
interest in the petition and its political nature should not deter the Court
from exercising review. 218 The Court reasoned that its role is to protect the
rule of law: when it is undermined by any state authority the identity of the
petitioner does not matter.219 This increased public interest litigation.220
The same decision also virtually eliminated the Court's justiciability
doctrine.221
These relaxed standards also applied to security policy and review of
222
military decisions. To this we should add the expansion of the scope of
administrative review, which now includes a reasonableness test, meaning
that all administrative actions have to be reasonable and proportional.2
The reasonableness test asks the question whether a reasonable public
authority could have reached the decision which has actually been reached;
for proportionality the Court imported the tripartite test used in
constitutional adjudication.2 4

Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice shall be competent(1) to make orders for the release of persons unlawfully detained or imprisoned.
(2) to order State and local authorities and the officials and bodies thereof, and
other persons carrying out public functions under law, to do or refrain from doing
any act in the lawful exercise of their functions or, if they were improperly elected
or appointed, to refrain from acting;
(3) to order courts ... and bodies and persons having judicial or quasi-judicial
powers under law, other than courts dealt with by this Law and other than
religious courts (batei din), to hear, refrain from hearing, or continue hearing a
particular matter or to void a proceeding improperly taken or a decision
improperly given.
Id.
217. Id. § 15(d)(2).
218. H.C.J. 910/86 Resler v. Minister of Defense [1986] Isr. S.C. 42(2) 441, 462.
219. Id. at466.
220. ITZHAK ZAmiR, THE ADMINISTRATIVE AuTHoRITY 82-83 (1996) (Hebrew).
221. For an elaboration of the Court's standing and justiciability doctrines, see Aharon Barak,
Forward:A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV.
19, 97-110 (2003).
222. Id. at 99-101.
223. Id. See generally H.C.J. 389/80 Yellow Pages v. Israel Broadcast Authority [1980] Isr.
S.C. 35(1)421; H.C.J. 297/82 Berger v. Minister of Interior pages [ 1992] Isr. S.C. 37(3) 29; H.C.J.
581/87 Tzucker v. Minister of Interior [1987] Isr. S.C. 42(4) 529.
224. See supra text accompanying note 215.
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These administrative standards also apply to the military government
in the Occupied Territories.225 On top of The Hague Regulations and the
Fourth Geneva Convention, the Court has repeatedly held that Israeli
administrative law applies to actions by the military commander.226
Accordingly, Palestinians can challenge military actions, administrative
acts and regular Knesset legislation.227
C. CrisisAdjudication
Although today the Israeli Supreme Court imposes almost no limits to
its review of security measures, this was not always the case. 28 When
Israel was founded all British mandatory legislation was automatically
incorporated into Israeli law, including emergency legislation.229 In 1945
the British High Commissioner promulgated the Defense (Emergency)
Regulations, granting substantial discretionary powers to the executive in
areas such as detentions, arrests, house demolitions and military courts.23 °
These powers were considered beyond the reach of either the Knesset or
the courts. 2 31 Some of these regulations were later modified, 23 2 but most
regulations remain and are especially relevant to security administration
in the Occupied Territories where Israel applies them as well.233
The Court started scrutinizing the use of emergency powers in 1950,
albeit in a limited fashion.234 One of the first cases concerned an Israeli
Palestinian, subject to military rule imposed at the time, who traveled from

225. Barak, supra note 221, at 104.
226. See, e.g., H.C.J. 69/81 Abu Ita v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria area [1981] Isr.
S.C. 37(2) 197; H.C.J. 393/82 Jamayat Askan v. I.D.F. commander in the Judea and Samaria area
[1982] Isr. S.C. 4(37) 785.
227. For a discussion on the Supreme Court's role in supervising the military government in
the Occupied Territories, see Eli Nathan, The Power of Supervision of the High Court of Justice
Over Military Government, in I MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY
ISRAEL 1967-1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 109-69 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982).
228. Ariel L. Bendor, The IsraeliConstitution and the FightAgainst Terrorism, 13 FORUM
CONSTITuTIONEL 37, 39 (2003).
229. Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, supra note 201, § 11.
230. Iton Rishmi (Official Gazette) 1442, supp. no. 2, at 855.
231. H.C.J. 46/50 Al Ayubi v. Minister of Defense, 4 Tsr. S.C. 222, 227.
232. For example, the Knesset regulated administrative detentions in 1979. See Emergency
Powers (Detention) Law-1979, 33 LSI 89 (1978-1979) (Isr.).
233. See The Proclamationon Law andAdministration,in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT INTHE
TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 450 (Meir Shamgar ed.,
1982).
234. H.C.J. 46/50 Al Ayubi v. Minister of Defense [1950] 4 Isr. S.C. 222. For more on the
military rule imposed on Arabs in Israel, see MENACHEM HOFNUNG, DEMOCRACY, LAW AND
NATIONAL SECURITY IN ISRAEL 89-95 (1996).
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his village to Jaffa to receive medical treatment. He procured the necessary
permit from the military authorities but remained in Jaffa after it expired.
An order was issued to deport the man back to his village to which he
objected by way of a petition to the Court. Rejecting the petition, the Court
held that its jurisdiction was limited, since the regulation gave the
authorities subjective discretion to decide on the measures as they saw
fit. 235 The Court's task was thus only to determine whether the authority

exceeded its power under the statute and if it acted in good faith-the
basic ultra vires requirement.236
In the Kardosh cases, decided ten years later, the Court rejected the
concept ofunlimited subjective discretion and subjected all administrative
actions to judicial review. 237 Although Kardosh excluded security actions
238 and later in Schnitzer,239 where
from its review, this changed in Baransa,
the Court announced its conception ofjudicial review of security measures
which applies today. According to this conception, security considerations
are no different than any other considerations the Court is entitled to
examine."4
Several reasons account for this switch. First, there was a general
increase in judicial review of administrative actions. Second, the
introduction of military law in the Occupied Territories and the continuing
occupation raised increasing concerns of human rights violations that the
Knesset and government were somewhat reluctant to address through the
political process. Third, the Court maintained a very high level of public
trust when compared to the political branches and was perceived as a
professional apolitical institution. 241' Fourth, the Court held that since

235. Id. at 223, 227-28 (Opinion of Agranat, J.).
236. Baruch Bracha, JudicialReview ofSecurity Powers in Israel: aNew Policy ofthe Courts,
28 STAN. J. INT'LL. 39,41 (1991).
237. H.C.J. 241/60 Kardosh v. Registrar of Companies [19601 Isr. S.C. 15, 1151; F.H. 16/61
company Registrar v. Kardosh [1961] Isr. S.C. 16, 1209.
238. H.C.J. 554/81 Baransa v. Commander of the Central Front [1981] Isr. S.C. 36(4) 247.
239. H.C.J. 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor [1988] Isr. S.C. 42(4) 617.
240. Id. at 640.
241. Id. at 217. In a comprehensive survey conducted in 1991, 72% of those polled said the
Court is the most moral institution in the country, 57% said it represents the common citizen, 79%
said it acts wisely, and 80% said the Court makes sure the state would not harm the citizens and
exceed its authority. Overall, 87% thought that the Court greatly contributes to the country. See
GAD BARZILAI ET AL., THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT AND THE ISRAELI PUBLIC 211, 217 (1994)
(Hebrew). Admittedly, the number might have changed in the past 15 years, and there are
indications to that effect. Comprehensive surveys for the "Israel Democracy Institute" demonstrate
that although public support for the Court has decreased somewhat, it is still very strong. In
response to the question how much do you trust the Supreme Court, the result in 2003 was 70%,
79% in 2004, 72% in 2005, and 68% in 2006. In response to the question of which institution best
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security organizations are essentially administrative entities, they should
not be exempt from legal supervision. The Court rationalized this by
maintaining that it will not replace the security officials'
24 2 discretion with its
own but will only examine the discretion's legality.
By going over some paradigmatic cases, the next sections will consider
the way the Israeli Supreme Court reviews security measures, showing two
distinct judicial approaches. The first, and somewhat similar to the U.S.
process approach, examines whether the Knesset authorized the executive
action. This approach, prominent in the years before the "constitutional
revolution," is seldom used today. The second approach, prevalent today,
is the substantive individual rights approach: it examines whether the
security measure fits substantive constitutional requirements. The cases
below are examples. They are perhaps the most salient cases of the past
decade, but they are indicative of the general trend of Israeli jurisprudence
on security issues.
1. Torture
In 1987 an inquiry committee (the Landau committee) was charged
with examining the GSS's (General Security Service, the equivalent of the
FBI) interrogation methods. 243 The Commission concluded that the use of

protects Israel's democracy, the results found the following percentages for the court: 42% in 2003,
47% in 2004,48% in 2005, and 47% in 2006, which was still the highest compared with the Prime
Minister, the Knesset, and the media. See Asher Arian, NIR ATMOR, YAEL HADAR, AUDITING
ISRAELI DEMOCRACY 2006: CHANGES INISRAEL'S POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM: DEALIGNMENT OR
REALIGNMENT 38 (2006), availableathttp://www.idi.org.il/hebrew/catalog.asp?pdid=223&did= 1
&hom=l (last visited on Feb. 6, 2008).
242. H.C.J. 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor [1988] Isr. S.C. 42(4), 617, 641-42. It
should be noted that up until then the Court relied on the British case of Liversidge v. Anderson,
[1942] A.C. 206,338, which held that review of security measures should be extremely limited and
deferential. However, the British conception of the role the courts should play changed, and the
courts accordingly assumed a more active role. The Israeli development thus reflects a similar
transition.
243. Two events led to the founding of the commission. The first was the case of Izat Nafsu,
a lieutenant in the Israeli army charged with treason. After his conviction he claimed to have been
tortured by the GSS, which resulted in a coerced confession. He was later acquitted. The second
case was the "bus 300 affair." Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Israeli bus full of civilians. The
GSS took control of the bus, apprehended the terrorists, and later claimed they were dead.
However, a picture in the newspaper the following day revealed that two terrorists were alive when
taken off the bus. It was later found out that GSS agents executed the two. The GSS tried to cover
its tracks and coordinated testimonies between agents. The cover up operation was ordered by the
head of the GSS. When this was revealed the president took it upon himself to pardon the agents
who were involved, even though charges had yet to be brought against them. The Court approved
the pardons. See also H.C.J. 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [ 1986] Isr. S.C. 40(3) 505. For
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moderate physical force when interrogating suspects was permitted and
that GSS interrogators may enjoy the criminal defense of necessity.2"
The GSS continued to conduct coercive interrogations, including
playing loud music, deprivation of sleep, prolonged sitting in painful
positions, tightening of hand and leg cuffs, shaking, hitting, and kicking.245
Although the report was the subject of criticism, the Court refused to
intervene until 1999, when it decided a petition submitted five years earlier
by an NGO-The Public Committee Against Torture.2 6
The Court held that the GSS does not have the requisite statutory
authority to conduct coercive interrogations. 47 It argued that the need for
express authorization to conduct such interrogations is a demand of the
rule of law and separation of powers, and that the Knesset should address
the issue directly. 248 Even though the Court struck down most of the
techniques the GSS used, those were struck down not because they were
unconstitutional per-se, so much as they could not be exercised under the
then legal regime. However, the Court invited the Knesset to legislate on
the matter.2 49 When the issue later came before the Knesset opinions were
split. Despite speculation that the Knesset will legalize some of the
methods prohibited by the Court,25 ° it refrained from doing so, possibly
because it did not want to go on the books as permitting torture or coercive
treatment or possibly because it was wary of international criticism.2
a more general overview, see Jordana S. Rubel, A Missed Opportunity: The Ramifications of the
Committee Against Torture's Failureto Adequately Address Israel's Ill-Treatmentof Palestinian
Detainees, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 699, 709-17 (2006).
244. The Commission balanced the competing interests: on the one hand some physical harm
to the suspect; on the other hand, the damage that can be caused by a terrorist attack. See Miriam
Gur-Arye, Can the War Against TerrorJustify the Use of Force in Interrogations?,in TORTURE:
A COLLECTION 184 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
245. Id. at 186. See also EMANUEL GRoss, THE STRUGGLE OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST
TERRORISM 76-8 (2006).

246. H.C.J. 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. The Government of Israel [1994]
Isr. S.C. 53(4) 817.
247. Id. at 843-44 (Granting authority to GSS interrogators to engage in physical force during
the interrogation of suspects of terrorist activities, which infringe on their right to dignity and
liberty, raises basic question of law and society, morality and policy, rule of law and security. These
should be answered by the legislature. This is what the principles of separation of powers, rule of
law and democracy mandate) (Opinion of Barak, P.).
248. Id. at 831.
249. Id. at 843-44.
250. Melissa Clark, Israel's High CourtofJustice Ruling on the GeneralSecurity Service use
of "Moderate Physical Pressure": an End to the Sanctioned Use of Torture?, 11 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 145, 182 (2000).

251. Three years later, when the Knesset enacted the GSS Law, the first piece of legislation
officially recognizing the GSS, it did not address the issue of the use of physical force in
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The decision challenged the conception that security is the exclusive
realm of the executive, deciding a sensitive issue that possibly entailed a
future loss of lives due to the prohibition of certain interrogation methods.
But it is also important, I believe, not to overstate the importance of the
case. The Court did not ban the use of torture or coercive treatment. It
referred the issue to the Knesset, so that the decision can be contemplated
there. By doing so, the Court adopted the American notion of separation
of powers discussed above.252 In this respect, the torture decision was
similar to older jurisprudence which examined the scope of administrative
authority. Absent statutory authorization the action was struck down.
253
2. The Separation Barrier Cases

The "Constitutional Revolution" of 1992 facilitated substantive
adjudication on individual rights grounds in constitutional and
administrative law. No longer was statutory authorization sufficient to
warrant the legality of the act. The court, bolstered by the new Basic Laws,
was willing to go further into its scrutiny of security matters. Nowhere was
this more evident in cases involving Palestinian terrorism as most of the
security measures were directed at that population. 54 Indeed, after the

interrogations (GSS Law-2002, S.H. 1832, at 179 (2002).
252. H.C.J. 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel at 845.
Whether it is appropriate for Israel, in light of its security difficulties, to sanction
physical means is an issue that must be decided by the legislative branch, which
represents the people . . . It is there that various considerations must be
weighed... It is there that the required legislation may be passed, provided, of
course, that the law "befit[s] the values of the State of Israel, is enacted for a
proper purpose, and [infringes the suspect's liberty] to an extent no greater than
required.
Id. (Opinion ofBarak, P.)
253. Using the word "barrier" rather than "wall" or "fence" has real and symbolic meaning.
Israel uses the term "fence," but the terminology itself is controversial and there is no accepted
term. See Geoffrey R. Watson, The "Wall" Decisions in Legal andPolitical Context, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 6, 7 (2005).
254. Examples include H.C.J. 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. Commander ofthe IDF
forces in the Gaza Strip [2004] Isr. S.C. 58(5) 585 (when carrying out its military operations against
terrorists, the IDF must take care of the local population, including water supply, medical attention,
food, and electricity); H.C.J. 10356/02 Hass v. Commander ofthe IDF in the West Bank [2002] Isr.
S.C. 58(3) 443 (when closing offa route to protect Israeli settlers in Hebron the military must take
into consideration the rights of Palestinians, including their civil liberties, such as freedom of
movement and religious liberty); H.C.J. 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the West Bank [2002]
Isr. S.C. 56(6) 352 (the military commander cannot relocate family members of terrorists from the

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2008

41

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20

Court did away with justiciability requirements, it no longer made sense
to carve out a specific realm free from judicial review.255
This also explains why the Court did not encounter great doctrinal
difficulty in deciding the Separation Barrier cases, which are illustrative
of the break from process-based discourse. After many military operations
failed in curtailing terrorist activities, the Israeli government decided, in
2002, to build a barrier from the northern part of the West Bank to the
South, in the hope of imposing a physical obstacle on terrorists. The
barrier itself was complicated, comprised of concrete walls, fences and
electronic surveillance. Construction in the specific route the government
wanted required the military commander to issue seizure decrees, seizing
private Palestinian lands in return for monetary compensation. 6
In a series of several dozen cases from 2004 to 2006, the Court
addressed petitions filed by Israelis and Palestinians challenging the
legality of the fence and its route. The majority were rejected, 257 but two
decisions, Beit Sourik and Mar'abe,258 culminated in an order to remove
and relocate several parts of the barrier. 259 Although the Court upheld the
military commander's authority under international law to construct a
barrier, when the decision was based on security grounds, it held that
segments of the barrier failed the proportionality test in that the damage to
Palestinians was greater than the added net gain in security for Israelis.26 °

West bank to the Gaza Strip if they themselves are not involved in terrorist activity).
255. Ariel L. Bendor, Justiciabilityof the IsraeliFightAgainst Terrorism, 39 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 149, 154 (2007).
256. Government decision from June 23,2002, detailed in H.C.J. 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village
Council v. 2 Government of Israel [2004] Isr. S.C. 58(5) 807, 816 (Opinion of Barak, P.). Id. at
818-19 (Opinion ofBarak, P.) (describing the Barrier's routs and the seizure decrees); seegenerally
SHAUL ARIELI, MICHAEL SFARD, THE WALL OF FOLLY 73-138 (2008) (in Hebrew).
257. See, e.g., H.C.J. 5488/04 Al-Ram Local Council v. Government of Israel (yet to be
published); H.C.J. 2942/05 Mantzur v. State of Israel (yet to be published); H.C.J. 426/05 Bidu
Village Council v. Government of Israel (yet to be published).
258. H.C.J. 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] Isr. S.C.
58(5) 807 [hereinafter Beit Sourik]; H.C.J. 7957/04 Mar'abe v. Prime Minister (yet to be
published).
259. There was also international treatment of Israel's decision to construct the fence. Pursuant
to a Palestinian request, the ICJ delivered an advisory opinion denouncing the construction of a
wall in the occupied territories, connecting it to the protection of settlements which are themselves
illegal under article 49(6) of the 4th Geneva Convention prohibiting the transfer of the occupier's
population into the occupied land. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (2004 I.C.J.) 4. 3 I.L.M. 1009 (2004). For an
analysis and criticism of the ICJ's decision, see David Kretzmer, ICJ Advisory Opinion on
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: the Advisory Opinion: the Light
TreatmentofInternationalHumanitarianLaw, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 88 (2005).
260. Beit Sourik [2004] Isr. S.C. 58(5) at 839-40. For a comprehensive analysis of the Court's
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After the decision was handed down, the military was forced to
reconsider all of the planned routes that would likely be challenged. Some
were changed according to the outlines provided by the Court and were
later upheld to be proportionate.
Separated by just five years from the torture decision, the Court
completed a move from a process based approach to a substantive
individual rights approach when reviewing security decisions. However,
it did this when the Israeli separation of powers scheme remained
essentially the same. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, the
parliamentary system enabled this shift by not being able to confront the
Court's new direction. This inability, although political, resulted from the
parliamentary separation of powers scheme.
3. Family Unification
Israeli immigration policy is governed mainly by three statutes. The
Law of Return, the symbol of the Jewish state, grants immediate citizen
status to Jews and their families. The Citizenship Law and the Entry into
Israel Law both deal with non-Jews and status other than citizenship. 61 To
these are added dozens of administrative regulations which establish
procedures for obtaining citizenship and permits. One such proceeding
refers to "family unification," meaning an Israeli citizen (Jewish or nonJewish) who married a non-citizen living outside Israel. The Israeli citizen
would then petition for his or her spouse to receive Israeli citizenship. That
petition would usually be granted, barring fictitious marriage or if the
person presents a danger to public safety in Israel.262 In 2002 this changed
for Israeli Palestinians who wished to marry a Palestinian living in the
Occupied Territories. Palestinian terrorism had reached all time highs.
Military operations were partially successful, and the barrier would take
a long time to complete.
Moreover, several terrorist attacks were carried out through the
assistance, at some level, of people being granted Israeli status by the
proportionality doctrine in this case see Moshe Cohen-Eliya, The Formal and the Substantive
Meanings of Proportionalityin the Supreme Court s Decision Regarding the Security Fence, 38
ISR. L. REv. 262 (2005).
261. Law of Return, 1950,4 LSI 114 (1950) (Isr.); Citizenship Law, 1952, 6 LSI 50 (1951-52
(Isr.); The Entry Into Israel Law, 1952, 111 S.H. 354. The Court has held that the government has
wide discretion in its immigration policy, which is the manifestation of state sovereignty H.C.J.
482/71 Clark v. Minister of Interior [1971] [sr. S.C. 27(1) 113; H.C.J. 758/88 Kendall v. Minister
of Interior [1988] Isr. S.C. 46(4) 505; H.C.J. 1689/94 Harari v. Minister of Interior [1994] Isr. S.C.
51(1) 15, 19; H.C.J. 4156/01 Dimitrovv. Ministryoflnterior [2001] Isr. S.C. 56(6) 289,293; H.C.J.
8093/03 Artmayev v. Minister of Interior (yet to be published, at § 11).
262. H.C.J. 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of Interior [1997] Isr. S.C. 53(2) 728.
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family unification policy.263 Consequently, the government decided to halt
family unifications for people living in the Territories altogether.2 64 Aware
that the decision, which would be reviewed as a regular administrative
decision, would have difficulty passing constitutional scrutiny, the Knesset
stepped in to bolster the government by enacting the Citizenship and Entry
into Israel (Temporary Order) Law of 2003.265
The Law prevents residents of the Occupied Territories (excluding
Israeli settlers) from receiving Israeli status, subject to some very narrow
exceptions.2 66 A couple can still get married, but joint residence in Israel
was prohibited. 26 7 Although the Law used neutral language, prohibiting the
acquisition of status for any resident of the Occupied Territories, it
invariably affected almost only Arab residents of Israel, who were the ones
marrying people from the Territories. The Law had a sunset clause of one
year, but was continually extended by the Knesset. 268 Realizing that the
Knesset would continue extending the Law, petitioners decided to
challenge the law in 2003.269

Three years later, the Court decided by a 6-5 majority to reject the
petitions. 270 Although the Court agreed with petitioners that the Law
violated the right to dignity and equality by discriminating against

263. Over 250,000 Palestinians have been extended Israeli citizenship since 1967; 97,000 of
them between 1993 and 2001. These post- 1967 Israeli Palestinians numbered a quarter of all Israeli
Palestinians involved in terrorism during the first 20 months of the second intifada. See Sammy
Smoha, The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish andDemocraticState, 8 NATIONS &
NATIONALISM 487 (2002) (citing Alex Fishman, The Right of Repatriation is Already Here, Yediot
Ahranot, May 24, 2002).
264. Government decision no. 1813 from May 12th, 2002, availableat http://www.hamoked.
org/items/2960.pdf (last visited on Oct. 15, 2008).
265. The Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order) 5763-2003, 1901 S.H. 544.
266. Id. If the husband is above 35 years or the wife is above 25; children under 14 and
children over 14 if the child has regularly lived in Israel; if the person has aided Israel (i.e.,
collaborator). Id. § 3(A)-(C). However, these exceptions are at the discretion of the minister of
Interior. Id. His discretion is subject to regular administrative review. See Basic Law: the Judiciary,
supranote 216.
267. The Nationality and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Order), supra note 265, § 2.
268. Id. § 5. The law has been extended three times. See R.C. (regulations compendium) No.
6331, at 834 (July 28, 2004); R.C. No. 6553, at 470 (Jan. 16, 2007); R.C. No. 6692, at 1134 (July
15, 2008).
269. For an analysis condemning the law on constitutional and moral grounds, see Guy
Davidof et al., State or Family? The Citizen and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary
Provision)-2003,8 MisHiPAT UMIMSHAL 643 (2005) (Hebrew).
270. H.C.J. 7052/03 Adalla v. Minister of Interior [2006] (yet to be published); see Daphne
Barak-Erez, Israel: Citizenship and Immigration Law in the Vise of Security, Nationality, and
Human Rights, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 184 (2008).
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Arabs, 271' The difference between the majority and minority rested on the
application of the proportionality requirement that can justify an
impairment of a right. Whereas the dissent held that a sweeping provision
preventing almost all of those seeking status from living in Israel is
disproportionate, the majority argued that considering the emergency
situation in Israel such limitations are proportionate.272 Some majority
judges specifically stated that the constitutionality of the law relied on its
sunset clause, believing that it will be changed.273
Notwithstanding the result, the citizenship case demonstrates the
Court's willingness to inquire into matters commonly held to be beyond
judicial review-immigration policy and security measures. The Court
examined the evidence presented by the parties, checking whether the
security concerns justified an impairment of constitutional rights. The fact
that it was a Knesset law being reviewed, rather than a government policy
or administrative decision, seemed to have no significant bearing on the
decision. In that sense, the methodology advanced by the Court in the GSS
case of checking for Knesset authorization was dismissed in the citizenship
case. Here the Knesset echoed the government's decision by enacting a
law which essentially ratified the decision. Yet this did not put an end to
judicial scrutiny.
4. Judicial Involvement in Other Security Related Areas
The cases above are paradigmatic. They illustrate the level of judicial
involvement in matters relating to national security. The occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 greatly contributed to the Court's
willingness to adjudicate security matters. As a result, the Court found
itself involved in almost every aspect of the occupation. So, for example,
the court decided cases concerning deportations of terrorists, suspected
terrorists and political leaders, and, while approving the practice of
deportation in emergencies, held that deportees must be given a right to be
heard prior to the deportation, or, if not possible, then after the deportation
271. Adalah [2006] 1754 § 46 (Opinion of Barak, P.). It was conceded that although the law
was phrased on neutral language, its effects were discriminatory, since almost only Israeli
Palestinians marry Palestinians from the Occupied Territories. Id.
272. Id. §§ 100-124 (Opinion of Cheshin, J.).
273. See id. §§ 9, 11 (Opinion of Levi, J.). This assessment proved incorrect. Although after
the release of the decision a public committee started work on a new Israeli immigration law, the
law was extended. It was amended, but not in a way that reflected the judges' concerns. See supra
text accompanying note 269. Upon another extension, several NGOs re-petitioned the Supreme
Court. The cases are still pending. See, e.g., H.C.J. 830/07 Adalah v. Minister of Interior (yet to be
decided) (a Hebrew copy of the petition can be found at http://www.adalah.org/features/fanuni/
famuni-may07-p.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2008)).
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took place.2 74 It ruled that the military cannot use Palestinian civilians as
"human shields" by prohibiting military practice to send Palestinians to
knock on suspected terrorists' doors so as not to expose soldiers to being
shot. 7 It held that targeted killings as a general practice are permitted
under international law but that every decision must be analyzed according
to the particular circumstances of the case.2 76 It ruled that seizures of
Palestinian land must be grounded in security reasons, invalidating seizure
decrees used to establish the Elon Moreh settlement.277 It held that
detainment of suspected Palestinian terrorists for 12 and 18 days prior to
bringing them before a judge is illegal. 8 It decided that relocation of
Palestinians from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip can only be done where
it is shown they are connected to terrorist activity.279 It held that a law
granting sweeping government immunity from tort suits filed by
Palestinians harmed in an "area of conflict" is unconstitutional, because it
disproportionately infringes on the constitutional right to property. 280 And
it held that the state cannot hold persons in administrative detention in the
hope that they will serve as bargaining chips in the future release of Israeli
prisoners of war.28'
In all these cases, aside from the torture case and the early cases
challenging the emergency regulations, the Court applied substantive
doctrines, meaning it identified the individual rights violations and
proceeded to examine their severity.282 The Court did experiment with U.S.
style separation of powers reasoning but abandoned it in favor of
examining the legality of the act itself. Of course, from the fact that the
274. H.C.J. Kawasme v. Minister of Defense [1980] Isr. S.C. 35(3) 113; H.C.J. 5973/92
Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defense [1993] Isr. S.C. 47(1) 267; for a full
and critical analysis, see DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT
OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 165-86 (2002).
275. H.C.J. 3799/02 Adalahv. I.D.F. West Bank Military Commander [2005] Isr. S.C. (yet to
be published).
276. H.C.J. 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel [2006] (yet to
be published).
277. H.C.J. 390/79 Dawikat v. Government of Israel [1980] Isr. S.C. 34(1) 1.
278. H.C.J. 3239/02 Mar ab v. I.D.F. Commander in the West Bank Area [2002] Isr. S.C.
57(2) 349.
279. H.C.J. 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in the West Bank [2002] Isr. S.C. 56(6) 352.
280. H.C.J. 8276/05 Adalah v. Minister of Defense [2006] (yet to be published).
281. F.H. 7048/97 Anonymous v. Minister ofDefense [2000] Isr. S.C. 54(l) 721; seegenerally
Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorismand the ProblemofAdministrative Detention in Israel:
Does A Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?, 18 ARIz. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 721 (2001); Emanuel Gross, The Laws of War Waged Between Democratic States and
Terrorist Organizations: Real or Illusive?, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 389 (2003).
282. For a more detailed, case by case development concerning the early and middle period,
see Bracha, supra note 236.
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Court examines every case brought before it does not follow that it reaches
overall better decisions or that it is more inclined to curb executive action.
It merely shows that the Israeli Court, located in a different separation of
powers system, chose to adjudicate crisis cases differently. 283 The Court's
method of substantive adjudication, coupled with relaxed threshold
requirements, make every security or crisis issue a legal one as well. The
Court does not perceive itself as bound by a separation of powers scheme,
and, in theory, is unconstrained in invalidating a specific policy or law,
regardless of the way it came into being.284
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEPARATION OF POWERS SCHEMES
AND JUDICIAL METHODOLOGY-COURTS AS REGULATORS

A. A PoliticalConstitution of Emergency Powers
Accounting for differences between two countries' legal regimes is
tricky. Many reasons can plausibly account for the differences elaborated
thus far. The different histories, the different national groups comprising
the state, and, of course, the constitutional and institutional structure. All
of these factors result in different approaches to adjudication generally,
and crisis adjudication, specifically. Evaluating the causality, that is, which
factor is more responsible for the disparity, is probably impossible. Thus,
we remain with reasonable educated guesses. Of course, terrorist attacks,
constant clashes with neighbors, and most of all the ongoing occupation,

283. There is a body of critical literature arguing that the Court's decisions in these areas
merely helped to perpetuate and legitimize the occupation. These arguments, which seem to me to
be partially correct, cannot be analyzed here as my argument is confined to the structural aspect of
the judicial doctrines. For these arguments, see Ronen Shamir, Landmark Cases and the
ReproductionofLegitimacy: the Caseoflsrael'sHigh CourtofJustice,24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 781,
783 (1990); KRETZMER, supra note 274, at 187.
284. See also Yigal Mersel, Judicial Review of Counter-TerrorismMeasures: The Israeli
Model for the Role of the JudiciaryDuringthe TerrorEra, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 67, 90-1
(2005). The Court adjudicates
almost any aspect of counter-terrorism, as well as a willingness to nullify
important executive actions. The Israeli court not only hears cases concerning ex
post activities, but also considers policies on an ex ante basis. It does not limit the
scope of its review to procedural aspects; instead, it rules on delicate issues of
combatant activities and interrogation conditions.
Id. (Footnote omitted).
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have shaped Israeli security adjudication in a way unlike any other
country.
I think that a good way to think about why the judicial reasoning is
different in these two countries has to do with the function of courts in a
political system. Similar to the task of regulators when there is market
failure, courts can function as regulators when it comes to correcting
political failures in the political "market., 285 To do this, the court first has
to identify when a political failure has taken place. Political failure,
broadly conceived, is a situation where one or more governmental
institutions are not functioning as they should, under the applicable
democratic theory. Political failure, therefore, is dependent on the political
structure a country adopts, and in this case the separation of powers
scheme.
Consider the U.S. system of separation of powers. The idea behind
creating co-equal branches of government was for "ambition to counter
ambition. 2 6 At its most basic, this means that Congress was supposed to
serve as a check on the President and vice versa. When there is
disagreement, the branches were meant to work things out by deliberation.
The same holds true for deliberation between the Senate and the House.
Taking this to be the objective of separation of powers, U.S. crisis
jurisprudence makes sense. The President has commander-in-chief powers,
but since those are hard to delineate, the courts often prefer that the
President receive congressional authorization when discharging an order.
The Framers' vision is thus secure because the President is not acting
alone but conferring with another branch. When the Court polices this
process, it is not making sure that the branches made a good or wise
decision, but that the constitutional structure has been preserved. To
borrow from Mark Tushnet, this is the "political constitution of emergency
powers, 287 according to which the court does not enforce substantive
285. For a similar view, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REvIEw 102-03 (1980). For an even more stringent view, see ROBERT A. DAHL,
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 182 (1989).
286. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 71 (James Madison).
287. Mark Tushnet, The PoliticalConstitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from
Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1451, 1458 (2007).
The Hamdan decision and its aftermath illustrates what I call the political
constitution of emergency powers, by which I mean nothing more elaborate than
that (a) the way in which emergency powers are structured in a well-functioning
democracy is a matter of fundamental importance, (b) the way in which they are
structured is at least as much a product of the fundamental structures of political
power-the distribution of authority between executive and legislature, only a small
part of which flows from the Constitution's texts or judicial precedents-as it is of
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individual rights norms, but rather attempts to maintain a procedural
framework of government manifested by the separation of powers scheme.
But is this the same in a parliamentary structure? Not quite.
Parliamentary systems embrace a different type of separation of powers.
Most importantly, there is no clear separation between the executive and
the legislature. Indeed, it hardly exists because the legislative and
executive branches are intertwined.288 In order to form a government, the
party that received the most seats needs to form a coalition with other
parties to ensure control of the legislature. Once that control has been
established, via coalition agreements, the process of assembling a
government gets underway by putting together a cabinet. If everything is
functioning as it should, this government, by definition, will continue to
enjoy parliamentary majority. The government will stay in power as long
as it has a parliamentary majority and the proposed statutes will usually
enjoy governmental backing. Of course, this is not always the case.
Oppositions can sometimes have their way if they happen to have a
specific majority in a specific session. Renegade party members who
officially belong to one of the coalition parties will choose to vote
differently on a specific issue if party discipline is not enforced.28 9 These
things happen, although I am less certain that they happen very often, at
least in a meaningful way that permanently alters the political balance.
The situation is even more stable in a party system where if one party
wins more than half the seats it has control ofparliament (and government)
with no need for power sharing. Of course, even there nothing is
guaranteed since, as Tushnet argues, there will be backbenchers who
belong to the ruling party but still attack its policies. 290 But here, I think,
Tushnet's point can be countered. In countries that have proportional
representation from a party list (like Israel), members of parliament have
a strong incentive to comply with party policy even if they object to it on
a personal level. Because they need party endorsement for reelection, they

judicially interpreted law, and (c) these structures are as permanent as those found
in the Constitution's written text. The role of the courts in a constitution of
emergency powers structured importantly by political interactions between
executive and legislature is, I suggest, a secondary or collateral issue, important
only in some circumstances.
Id.
288. Tim KooPMANs, CouRTs AND POuTICAL INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE VIEw 162
(2003).
289. For such cases, see Tushnet, supra note 2.
290. Id. at 282.
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cannot risk losing that support by not towing the party line, at least most
of the times, and in the most important issues.
Other mechanisms might help curb the government in a parliamentary
regime, such as bureaucracies, informal guidelines, and the press.2 9 ' It is
also true that "the executive government in a parliamentary system does
not have a free hand in putting into effect the policies initially favored by
its leading members. 292 But even if it does not have a "free hand," it is
still considerably less constrained, at least politically, than in a system of
divided government where there is a clear demarcation between legislature
and executive.
A preliminary conclusion suggests that the political constitution of
emergency powers which Tushnet supports 29 3 is weaker in a parliamentary
structure. Of course it can still exist to some extent, as Tushnet
demonstrates in the British context, 294 but at least in the Israeli context, as
the cases above demonstrate, it is less plausible.
B. The Move Toward a Legal Constitution ofEmergency Powers
A political constitution of emergency powers thus designates a smaller
role for courts. However, we have seen that in the Israeli context the Court
almost always has a say and many important issues will eventually make
their way there. Some may explain this trend by referring generally to
judicial activism and judicial aggrandizement.295 Others cite a general
move from formalistic doctrines to value laden standards.296
Yet it seems to me that the reasons for this trend also have to do with
structural political failures, which are perhaps more subtle in the United
States. It is thus no coincidence that the enlarged role for the Court
happened during a period when the public's trust of the political branches
was low. The reality of Israeli politics is that no one party has ever
managed to control the Knesset without the need to form coalitions with
other parties. A typical Israeli government, therefore, is usually comprised
of four or more parties. In order for a government to function many deals
291. Id. at 283.
292. Id.
293. Tushnet, supra note 287, at 1471-72.
294. Tushnet, supra note 2.
295. See generally Richard A. Posner, EnlightenedDespot, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 23, 2007;
Robert Bork, Barak's Rule, 27 AzURE 125 (2007). But see Barak Medina, FourMyths of Judicial
Review: A Response to RichardPosner's CritiqueofAharon Barak'sJudicialActivism, 49 HARv.
INT'L L.J. ONLINE 1 (2007), availableat http://www.harvardilj.org/online/1 16 (last visited on Feb.
6, 2008).
296. MENACHEM MAUTNER, THE DECLINE OF FORMAuSM AND THE RISE OF VALUES IN
ISRAELI LAW (1993).
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are struck with small parties, giving them disproportionate power when
compared to their constituency.
Realizing this problem in Israeli politics, people and organizations
began to look elsewhere for a solution. They gradually turned to the Israeli
Supreme Court, which eventually accommodated their demands. The
Court, unlike the political branches, was highly regarded by the general
public and the Israeli intelligentsia, second only to the army. It was
perceived as a neutral apolitical branch free of political partisanship. The
Court then, rather than the Knesset or government, came to embody
majoritarian preferences.297
Now, add to this the separation of powers scheme. Because the
government is comprised of Knesset members, a parliamentary majority
is almost always guaranteed. This means that opposition parties exercise
very weak supervisory functions. Moreover, most of the Knesset
committees, where the real legislative work is done, are headed by
coalition members, further frustrating meaningful checks on executive
power. In addition, foreign affairs and security policy were historically
considered the exclusive realm of executive power, so although the
Knesset can legislate on these matters it rarely does so.298 Similarly,
Knesset supervision over the judiciary is weak. There is a high level of
judicial independence and appointments are tenure until the age of
seventy.299 Removal ofjudges for disciplinary reasons is possible but very
rare.3"' Consequently, most of the constraints imposed on judges are selfimposed, and, unlike in the United States, there is very little in the way of
tradition advocating such restraint or adherence to a strict separation of
powers scheme.3"' Consider also Israeli constitutional law and theory-all
developed by the Court in a relatively short amount of time. There is no
discussion of "the Framers" or "original intent."3 2 Because there is little
in the form of constitutional text and traditions, the court has been virtually
unopposed in developing judicial review while the Knesset's acquiescence

297. Yoav Dotan, JudicialReview andPoliticalAccountability: the Case of the High Court
ofJustice in Israel,32 ISR. L. REv. 448, 450 (1998). One of the reasons is the way supreme court
judges are appointed, which is through an essential non-political committee comprised of three
supreme court judges, two ministers, two Knesset members (from the coalition and opposition, and
two lawyers selected by the Israeli Bar. Basic Law: The Judiciary § 4 (S.H. 1110, at 78 (Mar. 8,
1984))).
298. H.C.J. 5128/94 Federman v. Minister of Police [2003] Isr. S.C. 48(5) 647 (the realms of
foreign relations and foreign affairs are considered to be under the government's responsibility).
299. Courts Law of 1984, § 13 (S.H. 1123, at 198 (Aug. 31, 1984)).
300. Id.§ 14.
301. Gelpe, supra note 212, at 557-559.
302. Id. at 558-59.
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was striking considering the vocal (but only vocal) opposition it
engendered. Thus, in many areas the Court has stepped in to discount for
parliamentary ineffectiveness. The Court, unlike the Knesset, did not feel
it needed to acquiesce to government policy. On the contrary, it saw itself
as a protector of the rule of law where the Knesset failed.
These developments are perhaps most salient in the area of national
security and emergencies. In the beginning the Court employed a process
based approach familiar from the U.S. context. Things soon changed as
part of a larger transformation the system was undergoing. Especially
noteworthy is the change that took place after the "Constitutional
Revolution." The Court shifted to a rights based approach, adopting
doctrines of judicial balancing and proportionality. It abandoned the
process based approach when it realized there was not much process to
begin with, as there was virtually no interbranch dialogue, so important in
the U.S. context. Initially, this was due to British Mandatory legislation
which gave wide discretionary powers to the executive. But the Knesset
opted not to amend many of these statutes, thus relegating emergencies to
the government and voluntarily excluding itself from having a say in these
areas. 30 3 Security measures, especially in, but not limited to, the Occupied
Territories, do not even require the Knesset's authorization (the equivalent
of congressional authorization) because under the international law of
occupation the military government is both the executive and the
legislator.3" 4 Coupled with the prolonged state of emergency and military
occupation of the Palestinian Territories, the Court was bound to step in
and "exert [its] balancing influence.""3 5 Indeed, since the judiciary accreted
power generally, there was no particular reason to stay away from security
measures. In fact, because of the almost nonexistent legislative check on
executive power when it came to emergency measures, the Court was
conceivably even more justified in reviewing these actions.
Now, compare this with the United States, where the emergencynormalcy dichotomy is more distinct and where a tradition of separation
of powers was articulated back in the eighteenth century. The
constitutional structure aspires to achieve a confrontation between
Congress and the President, the opposite from a parliamentary system. The
President knows that he needs congressional authorization on many issues
and that acting solely on the premise of inherent executive power is risky.

303. Bracha, supra note 236, at 56.
304. Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Selective Justice: The Case of Israel and the Occupied
Territories, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 934, 942 (2003); see generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (2004).
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These elements are lacking in the Israeli situation. Thus, it seems very
likely that in addition to all of the differences between the two countries,
the separation of powers scheme-a formal structure designed to organize
government-affects substantive judicial decisions in crises and
emergencies. Because the United States advocates a stricter separation of
powers scheme, at least rhetorically, the courts are more inclined to
enforce such a scheme in emergencies, notwithstanding some recent
substantive impulses.
This comports with the general sentiment of judicial restraint in
emergencies. In the U.S. context, crisis adjudication is synonymous with
separation of powers since the political branches are considered the best
equipped to deal with these situations. Courts, from an institutional
perspective, are not.3 °6
But in Israel, where the government invariably has a majority in the
Knesset, and where security measures are almost the exclusive realm of
the executive, the weight shifts to the Court as an institution that is better
suited at curbing executive enthusiasm. It is true that the political history
in Israel, which left many unsatisfied with the performance of the Knesset,
has contributed to this institutional shift. This is why, perhaps, in other
countries with established parliamentary history, the courts are more
inclined to take a backseat during emergencies. 3 7 A separate and
interesting sociological question is why the dissatisfaction with the
political branches occurred, and why people turned to the courts, but this
Article's argument is that whatever the reasons behind this phenomenon
may be, the separation of powers scheme may have played an important
role in that shift.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Article attempted to explain the U.S and Israeli approaches for
adjudicating crisis cases. It did so by arguing that a helpful way to
306. There can be several reasons for this. Emergencies require real time decision making; the
decisions are informed by complex security considerations which the court lacks the competency
to evaluate; and there is far less institutional legitimacy for the court to shape national security
policy. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN.
L. REv. 605 (2003).
307. Although this too may be changing. The British House of Lords, following the enactment
of the Human Rights Act of 1998 and in compliance with the European Convention on Human
Rights-1950, has recently ruled that the British government cannot detain terrorist suspects
indefinitely. See A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004]
UKHL 56, availableat http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld2004O5/ldjudgmt/jdO4l216/
a&oth-1.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
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understand emergency adjudication is through the lens of the separation
of powers. Both systems seek to accommodate emergencies within the
existing constitutional structure. However, they achieve this in different
ways. The United States adopts a process based institutional approach
focusing on the separation of powers scheme. On this view, the Court
serves as a referee between the President and Congress, making sure that
they will share power in the exercise of war powers and national security.
In contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court asserts a more forceful position. It
subjects security measures to substantive individual rights doctrines and
shows less deference to the political branches. I then sought to explain the
reasons for these differences. Although many factors account for these
disparities, I suggested that the separation of powers structure in Israel,
political instability, and the concentration of greater power in the executive
at the expense of the legislature is a probable reason accounting for the
different approaches.
There is still the question which approach is better. I did not address
that issue. First, because to judge what is better one needs a more or less
comprehensive theory of what is the good in these situations and this is
impossible to accommodate in one Article. Moreover, the question "what
is better" is somewhat incoherent as it is very probable that both systems
produce good and bad results and the decision as to which generates more
good results will depend on what is good. This is where reasonable people
tend to disagree. Second, I was more interested in showing how different
separation of powers schemes can lead to different substantive results.
This insight is uncontroversial but is rarely recognized. In this respect, I
believe the connection between form and substance is striking.
One thing is clear though. Providing a good recipe for government is
contingent on institutional design. Yes, there can be activist judges or
political considerations. That too is part of constitutional politics. But
judges, like other institutional actors, are also constrained by their
institutional affiliation.30 8 The way that institution-in this case the
court-is positioned in the overall scheme of governance has far reaching
implications, ones we often neglect to address. At the same time, this
conclusion also has a liberating message. Since much of the methodology
hinges on institutional design, we have the power to change it through a
purposeful transformation of our institutions.

308. This is the neo-institutionalist view in political science. See Barry Friedman, The Politics
of JudicialReview, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 263 (2005).
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